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The orbitofrontal cortex represents the reward or affective value of primary reinforcers including taste, 
touch, texture, and face expression. It learns to associate other stimuli with these to produce representations 
of the expected reward value for visual, auditory, and abstract stimuli including monetary reward value. The 
orbitofrontal cortex thus plays a key role in emotion, by representing the reward value of the goals for action. 
The learning process is stimulus-reinforcer association learning. Negative reward prediction error neurons 
are related to this affective learning. Activations in the orbitofrontal cortex correlate with the subjective 
emotional experience of affective stimuli, and damage to the orbitofrontal cortex impairs emotion-related 
learning, emotional behaviour, and subjective affective state. Top-down attention to affect modulates 
orbitofrontal cortex representations, and attention to intensity modulates representations in earlier cortical 
areas that represent the physical properties of stimuli. Top-down word-level cognitive inputs can bias 
affective representations in the orbitofrontal cortex, providing a mechanism for cognition to influence 
emotion. Whereas the orbitofrontal cortex provides a representation of reward or affective value on a 
continuous scale, areas beyond the orbitofrontal cortex such as the medial prefrontal cortex area 10 are 
involved in binary decision-making when a choice must be made. For this decision-making, the orbitofrontal 
cortex provides a representation of the value of each specific reward on the same scale, with no conversion to 
a common currency. Increased activity in a lateral orbitofrontal cortex non-reward area provides a new 
attractor-related approach to understanding and treating depression. Consistent with the theory, the lateral 
orbitofrontal cortex has increased functional connectivity in depression, and the medial orbitofrontal cortex, 




 The functions of the orbitofrontal cortex are considered here, based on its connections, 
neurophysiology, activation in functional neuroimaging studies, and the effects of damage to and dysfunction 
of the orbitofrontal cortex. This evidence, and differences in its functional connectivity in depression, has led 
to a new non-reward attractor theory of depression. Activity in the orbitofrontal cortex is compared to that in 
the areas that project to it, and to the activity in the areas to which it projects. This enables development of a 
theory of how sensory representations in the input regions are transformed into reward-related value 
representations used to make decisions (choices) based on reward value in areas beyond the orbitofrontal 
cortex to which it projects. I also describe evidence for how top-down cognitive and attentional inputs 
coming from beyond the orbitofrontal cortex can influence the affective representations in the orbitofrontal 
cortex, showing how cognition and top-down attention descend down into this emotional system in the brain 
to influence what we feel. The paper is dedicated to Larry Weiskrantz, whose pioneering discoveries include 
that the amygdala is a part of the temporal lobe involved in emotion (Weiskrantz, 1956), and with colleagues 
that some aspects of emotion-related processing are present in patients with damage to the primary visual 
cortex, V1 (de Gelder, Vroomen, Pourtois, & Weiskrantz, 1999; Tamietto, et al., 2009; Tamietto, Pullens, de 
Gelder, Weiskrantz, & Goebel, 2012). Larry Weiskrantz was an inspiring mentor when I was an 
undergraduate medical student at Cambridge, and a wonderful colleague at Oxford since then. 
Given that emotions can be considered as states elicited by rewards and punishers, or of not 
receiving an expected reward (non-reward) or not receiving a punisher (relief) (Rolls, 2013b, 2014a, 2014b) 
(see Section 11), a key contribution of the orbitofrontal cortex to emotion is part of the context of the 
discoveries and advances described here, which are relevant to our understanding of emotion and its 
disorders, including those produced by damage to the orbitofrontal cortex, and depression. 
The focus is on humans and macaques, because there are many topological, cytoarchitectural, and 
probably connectional similarities between macaques and humans with respect to the orbitofrontal cortex 
(see Fig. 1 and Carmichael & Price, 1994; Henssen, et al., 2016; Kringelbach & Rolls, 2004; Öngür & Price, 
2000; Passingham & Wise, 2012; Petrides & Pandya, 1995; Price, 2006; Price, 2007; Rolls, 2014a).  The 
orbitofrontal cortex is much less well developed in rodents, which has only an agranular orbitofrontal cortex 
which corresponds to a small posterior part of the primate orbitofrontal cortex (Passingham & Wise, 2012; 
Rolls, 2014a; Wise, 2008), and that is why the rodent orbitofrontal cortex is not considered here. Indeed, the 
orbitofrontal cortex has increased in proportion more than any other part of the frontal lobes in humans 
(Semendeferi, Armstrong, Schleicher, Zilles, & Van Hoesen, 1998) (K.Zilles, personal communication, 
2017).  
Moreover, the primate orbitofrontal cortex receives visual information from the inferior temporal 
visual cortex, which is a highly developed area for primate vision enabling invariant visual object and face 
recognition (Rolls, 2000a; Rolls, 2007c, 2011b; Rolls, 2012b; Rolls, 2016a; Rolls & Deco, 2002), and which 
provides visual inputs used in the primate orbitofrontal cortex for one-trial object-reward association reversal 
learning, and for representing face expression and identity. Moreover, the specialization of the primate visual 
system for processing what is at the fovea makes the information that it passes on to receiving structures 
quite different from that in rodents (Rolls, Aggelopoulos, & Zheng, 2003a; Rolls & Wirth, 2017). Further, 
even the taste system of primates and rodents may be different, with obligatory processing from the nucleus 
of the solitary tract via the thalamus to the cortex in primates, but a subcortical pathway in rodents via a 
pontine taste area to the amygdala, and differences in where satiety influences taste responsive neurons in 
primates and rodents (Norgren, 1984; Rolls, 2014a, 2015c, 2016b, 2016d, 2017b; Rolls & Scott, 2003). 
  
2. Connections 
Part of the background for understanding neuronal responses in the orbitofrontal cortex is the 
anatomical connections of the orbitofrontal cortex, linked across primates by cytoarchitectural comparisons 
(Barbas, 1995, 2007; Carmichael & Price, 1994; Carmichael & Price, 1995; Henssen, et al., 2016; Mackey & 
Petrides, 2010; Öngür & Price, 2000; Pandya & Yeterian, 1996; Petrides & Pandya, 1995; Petrides, 
Tomaiuolo, Yeterian, & Pandya, 2012; Price, 2006; Price, 2007; Rolls, 2017c; Saleem, Kondo, & Price, 
2008; Saleem, Miller, & Price, 2014) (Figs. 2 and 1). It should be noted from Fig. 1 that the lateral 
orbitofrontal cortex, area 47/12 in humans and 12 in macaques, extends round the inferior prefrontal 
convexity, where is adjoins area 45 in the inferior frontal gyrus (Saleem, et al., 2014). A schematic diagram 
that helps to show the stage of processing in different sensory streams of the orbitofrontal cortex is provided 
in Fig. 3. This shows that the orbitofrontal cortex can be thought of as receiving from the ends of each 
modality-specific “what” cortical pathway. 
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Rolls et al. (1990) discovered a taste area with taste-responsive neurons in the lateral part of the 
macaque orbitofrontal cortex, and showed anatomically that this was the secondary taste cortex in that it 
receives a major projection from the primary taste cortex (Baylis, Rolls, & Baylis, 1995). This region 
projects on to more anterior areas of the orbitofrontal cortex (Baylis, et al., 1995). Taste neurons are also 
found more medially (Critchley & Rolls, 1996c; Pritchard, et al., 2005; Rolls, 2008c; Rolls & Baylis, 1994; 
Rolls, Critchley, Wakeman, & Mason, 1996a).  
In the mid orbitofrontal cortex, there is an area with olfactory neurons (Rolls & Baylis, 1994) and 
anatomically, there are direct connections from the primary olfactory cortex, pyriform cortex, to area 13a of 
the posterior orbitofrontal cortex, which in turn has onward projections to a middle part of the orbitofrontal 
cortex (area 13) (Barbas, 1993; Carmichael, Clugnet, & Price, 1994; Morecraft, Geula, & Mesulam, 1992; 
Price, 2007; Price, et al., 1991) (see Fig. 1).  
Thorpe et al. (1983) found neurons with visual responses in the orbitofrontal cortex, and 
anatomically, visual inputs reach the orbitofrontal cortex directly from the inferior temporal cortex (Saleem, 
et al., 2008) (where object and face identity are represented (Rolls, 2007c, 2016a)), from the cortex in the 
superior temporal sulcus (Saleem, et al., 2008) (where face expression and gesture are represented 
(Hasselmo, Rolls, & Baylis, 1989)), and from the temporal pole (see Barbas, 1988, 1993, 1995; Barbas & 
Pandya, 1989; Carmichael & Price, 1995; Morecraft, et al., 1992; Seltzer & Pandya, 1989). There are 
corresponding auditory inputs (Barbas, 1988, 1993; Rolls, Critchley, Browning, & Inoue, 2006; Romanski & 
Goldman-Rakic, 2001; Romanski, et al., 1999).  
Some neurons in the orbitofrontal cortex respond to oral somatosensory stimuli such as the texture of 
food (Rolls, Critchley, Browning, Hernadi, & Lenard, 1999a; Rolls, Verhagen, & Kadohisa, 2003d), and 
anatomically there are inputs to the orbitofrontal cortex from somatosensory cortical areas 1, 2 and SII in the 
frontal and pericentral operculum, and from the insula (Barbas, 1988; Carmichael & Price, 1995). The caudal 
orbitofrontal cortex receives inputs from the amygdala (Price, 2006; Price, et al., 1991). The orbitofrontal 
cortex also receives inputs via the mediodorsal nucleus of the thalamus, pars magnocellularis, which itself 
receives afferents from temporal lobe structures such as the prepyriform (olfactory) cortex, amygdala, and 
inferior temporal cortex  (see Öngür & Price, 2000). These connections provide some routes via which the 
responses of orbitofrontal cortex neurons can be produced. Within the orbitofrontal cortex, there are many 
intrinsic connections (Öngür & Price, 2000), and these may be part of what enables many orbitofrontal 
cortex neurons to have multimodal responses, as described below and elsewhere (Rolls, 2006, 2014a, 2016a). 
 The orbitofrontal cortex projects back to temporal lobe areas such as the amygdala (Barbas, 2007) 
and temporal cortex (Saleem, et al., 2008; Saleem, et al., 2014). The orbitofrontal cortex also has projections 
to the anterior cingulate cortex (Carmichael & Price, 1996; Morecraft & Tanji, 2009; Palomero-Gallagher, et 
al., 2015; Price, 2006; Vogt, 2009), medial prefrontal cortex area 10 (Price, 2007), entorhinal and perirhinal 
cortex (Barbas, 2007; Insausti, Amaral, & Cowan, 1987; Saleem, et al., 2008; Saleem, et al., 2014) providing 
a route for reward information to reach the hippocampus (Rolls, 2015b; Rolls & Xiang, 2005), preoptic 
region and lateral hypothalamus (where neurons respond to the sight and taste of food, and show sensory-
specific satiety (Burton, Rolls, & Mora, 1976; Rolls, Burton, & Mora, 1976)), and these connections provide 
some routes via which the orbitofrontal cortex can influence behavior (Rolls, 2014a) and memory (Rolls, 
2015b; Rolls & Xiang, 2005). The orbitofrontal cortex also projects to the ventral striatum (Ferry, Ongur, 
An, & Price, 2000) and head of the caudate nucleus (Haber, Kim, Mailly, & Calzavara, 2006; Kemp & 
Powell, 1970), and these pathways in part via the habenula provide a route for the orbitofrontal cortex and 
related structures to introduce reward and non-reward-related information partly via the habenula into the 
dopamine and serotonin systems in the brainstem, as shown in Fig. 2 (Rolls, 2017c). Indeed, the computation 
of expected value, outcome value, and their difference which is an error signal is computed in the 
orbitofrontal cortex and its connected structures, and provides a source of this information for the dopamine 
neurons implicated in positive reward error processing (Schultz, 2016) and the serotonin neurons via which 
many antidepressants act  (Rolls, 2017c) (see below). 
 
3. Effects of damage to the macaque orbitofrontal cortex  
 Part of the evidence on the functions of the orbitofrontal cortex comes from the effect of lesions of 
the orbitofrontal cortex. Macaques with lesions of the orbitofrontal cortex are impaired at tasks that involve 
learning about which stimuli are rewarding and which are not, and are especially impaired at altering 
behaviour when reinforcement contingencies change. The monkeys may respond when responses are 
inappropriate, e.g., no longer rewarded, or may respond to a non-rewarded stimulus. For example, monkeys 
with lateral orbitofrontal / inferior prefrontal convexity damage are impaired on Go/NoGo task performance 
in that they Go on the NoGo trials (Iversen & Mishkin, 1970); and in an object reversal task in that they 
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respond to the object which was formerly rewarded with food (Iversen & Mishkin, 1970). Similar effects 
were found in another study when the lesions included the lateral orbitofrontal cortex (Jones & Mishkin, 
1972). Below, I interpret this as a failure to respond to non-reward, given the activations found in humans in 
this region in a reward reversal task (Kringelbach & Rolls, 2003) (confirmed in monkeys (Chau, et al., 
2015)) and when losing money (O'Doherty, Kringelbach, Rolls, Hornak, & Andrews, 2001a).  
Medial orbitofrontal cortex (areas 13 and 11) lesions do not impair non-reward tasks, but, consistent 
with our evidence that neurons in the medial orbitofrontal cortex represent reward value in that they no 
longer respond to the reward when it is devalued by feeding it to satiety (Critchley & Rolls, 1996a; Rolls, 
Sienkiewicz, & Yaxley, 1989), do impair the effects on behaviour of reward devaluation (Izquierdo, Suda, & 
Murray, 2004; Murray & Izquierdo, 2007). 
 Damage to the caudal orbitofrontal cortex in the monkey also produces emotional changes (e.g., 
decreased aggression to humans and to stimuli such as a snake and a doll), and a reduced tendency to reject 
foods such as meat (Butter, McDonald, & Snyder, 1969; Butter & Snyder, 1972; Butter, Snyder, & 
McDonald, 1970; Murray & Izquierdo, 2007) or to display the normal preference ranking for different foods 
(Baylis & Gaffan, 1991).  
 In the next sections, the representations of reward value found in the orbitofrontal cortex but not in 
the preceding cortical areas from which the orbitofrontal cortex receives it inputs (Fig. 3) (Rolls, 2014a, 
2014b, 2016a) are described. 
 
4. Taste, olfaction, flavor, oral texture, temperature: reward value 
4.1. Taste: a primary reinforcer. 
 One of the discoveries that have helped us to understand the functions of the orbitofrontal cortex in 
behaviour is that it contains a major cortical representation of taste (see Kadohisa, Rolls, & Verhagen, 2005; 
Rolls, 2008c; Rolls, 2014a, 2016d; Rolls & Scott, 2003; Rolls, et al., 1990) (cf. Figs. 2 and 3). Given that 
taste can act as a primary reinforcer, that is without learning as a reward or punisher, we now have the start 
for a fundamental understanding of the function of the orbitofrontal cortex in stimulus-reinforcer association 
learning (Rolls, 1999a; Rolls, 2004a, 2014a, 2016a). We know how one class of primary reinforcers reaches 
and is represented in the orbitofrontal cortex. A representation of primary reinforcers is essential for a system 
that is involved in learning associations between previously neutral stimuli and primary reinforcers, e.g. 
between the sight of an object, and its taste (Rolls, 2014a). 
 The representation (shown by analysing the responses of single neurons in macaques) of taste in the 
primate orbitofrontal cortex includes robust representations of the prototypical tastes sweet, salt, bitter and 
sour (Rolls, et al., 1990), but also separate representations of the “taste” of water (Rolls, et al., 1990), and of 
protein or umami as exemplified by monosodium glutamate (Baylis & Rolls, 1991; Rolls, 2000c) and inosine 
monophosphate (Rolls, et al., 1996a; Rolls, Critchley, Browning, & Hernadi, 1998). Examples of two 
orbitofrontal cortex neurons with different responses to different taste stimuli are shown in Fig. 4. A very 
important discovery is that each neuron responds to different combinations of the stimuli. This provides the 
basis for the brain to encode very many different stimuli, because the responses of the neurons are relatively 
independent (Rolls, 2017a; Rolls & Treves, 2011). It also provides the basis for sensory-specific satiety, that 
is, for devaluation of the reward value of a particular food eaten to satiety by habituation of one type of 
combination-sensitive neuron (Rolls, 2014a, 2016d). As will be described below, some neurons have taste-
only responses, and others respond to a variety of oral somatosensory stimuli, including for some neurons 
viscosity (Rolls, et al., 2003d), fat texture (Rolls, et al., 1999a; Verhagen, Rolls, & Kadohisa, 2003), and for 
other neurons astringency as exemplified by tannic acid (Critchley & Rolls, 1996c). 
 The nature of the representation of taste in the orbitofrontal cortex is that for the majority of neurons 
the reward value of the taste is represented. The evidence for this is that the responses of orbitofrontal taste 
neurons are modulated by hunger (as is the reward value or palatability of a taste). In particular, it has been 
shown that orbitofrontal cortex taste neurons gradually stop responding to the taste of a food as the monkey 
is fed to satiety (Rolls, et al., 1996a; Rolls, et al., 1989). The example shown in Fig. 5 is of a single neuron 
with taste, olfactory, and visual responses to food, and the neuronal responses elicited through all these 
sensory modalities showed a decrease. The decrease is relatively specific to the food eaten to satiety, and the 
responses of these neurons are thus very closely related to sensory-specific satiety. The responses of these 
orbitofrontal cortex neurons thus reflect the preferences of the macaque for different sensory stimuli 
(Critchley & Rolls, 1996a; Rolls, et al., 1989), and some neurons encode relative preferences (Tremblay & 
Schultz, 1999).  
In contrast, the representation of taste in the primary taste cortex (Scott, Yaxley, Sienkiewicz, & 
Rolls, 1986; Yaxley, Rolls, & Sienkiewicz, 1990) is not modulated by hunger (Rolls, Scott, Sienkiewicz, & 
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Yaxley, 1988; Yaxley, Rolls, & Sienkiewicz, 1988). Thus in the primate primary taste cortex, the reward 
value of taste is not represented, and instead the identity and intensity of the taste are represented (Rolls, 
2016b).  
Additional evidence that the reward value of food is represented in the orbitofrontal cortex is that 
monkeys work for electrical stimulation of the orbitofrontal cortex if they are hungry, but not if they are 
satiated (Mora, Avrith, Phillips, & Rolls, 1979; Rolls, 2014a). Further, neurons in the orbitofrontal cortex are 
activated from many brain-stimulation reward sites (Mora, Avrith, & Rolls, 1980; Rolls, Burton, & Mora, 
1980). Thus there is clear evidence that it is the reward value of taste that is represented in the orbitofrontal 
cortex (see further Rolls, 1999a; Rolls, 2000d, 2014a), and this is further supported by the finding that 
feeding to satiety decreases the activation of the human orbitofrontal cortex to the food eaten to satiety in a 
sensory-specific way (Kringelbach, O'Doherty, Rolls, & Andrews, 2003). Sensory-specific satiety is part of a 
mechanism to facilitate behavioural switching between different positive reinforcers, and in the case of food, 
may facilitate eating a varied diet with the consequent beneficial nutritional implications, but may contribute 
to overeating and obesity if too much variety is available (Rolls, 2014a, 2016d).  
 Although some taste neurons are found laterally in the orbitofrontal cortex (area 12o) (Rolls & 
Baylis, 1994; Rolls, Critchley, Mason, & Wakeman, 1996b; Rolls, et al., 1990), others are found through the 
middle and even towards the medial part of the orbitofrontal cortex in areas 13m and 13l (see Fig. 1) 
(Critchley & Rolls, 1996a, 1996c; Pritchard, et al., 2005; Pritchard, Schwartz, & Scott, 2007; Rolls & Baylis, 
1994; Rolls, et al., 1996a).  
Functional neuroimaging studies have shown that the most medial part of the human orbitofrontal 
cortex is activated by taste, oral texture, and olfactory stimuli (de Araujo, Kringelbach, Rolls, & Hobden, 
2003a; de Araujo & Rolls, 2004; de Araujo, Rolls, Kringelbach, McGlone, & Phillips, 2003c; de Araujo, 
Rolls, Velazco, Margot, & Cayeux, 2005; Francis, et al., 1999; Gottfried, Small, & Zald, 2006; McCabe & 
Rolls, 2007; O'Doherty, et al., 2000; Rolls, Kringelbach, & de Araujo, 2003b; Rolls & McCabe, 2007; Small, 
Gerber, Mak, & Hummel, 2005; Small, Zatorre, Dagher, Evans, & Jones-Gotman, 2001), and that the 
activations correlate with ratings of subjective pleasantness (Kringelbach & Rolls, 2004; Rolls, 2014a). A 
study by Rolls, Verhagen and Kadohisa (see Rolls, 2008c) showed that there are taste neurons in the medial 
orbitofrontal cortex in regions more lateral than 7 mm from the midline, including areas 13m and 13l. 
 Corresponding to the findings in non-human primate single neuron neurophysiology, in human 
functional neuroimaging experiments (e.g., with functional magnetic resonance image, fMRI), it has been 
shown that there is an orbitofrontal cortex area activated by sweet taste (Francis, et al., 1999; Small, et al., 
2007; Small, et al., 1999), and that there are at least partly separate areas activated by the aversive taste of 
saline (NaCl, 0.1M) (O'Doherty, Rolls, Francis, Bowtell, & McGlone, 2001b), by pleasant touch (Francis, et 
al., 1999; Rolls, et al., 2003c), and by pleasant vs. aversive olfactory stimuli (Francis, et al., 1999; 
O'Doherty, et al., 2000; Rolls, 2000d; Rolls, et al., 2003b). Umami (protein) taste is not only represented by 
neurons in the primate orbitofrontal cortex (Baylis & Rolls, 1991; Rolls, et al., 1996a), but also human fMRI 
studies show that umami taste is represented in the orbitofrontal cortex, with an anterior part responding 
supralinearly to a combination of monosodium glutamate and inosine monophosphate (de Araujo, et al., 
2003a).  Some orbitofrontal cortex neurons respond to the ‘taste’ of water in the mouth (Rolls, et al., 1990), 
and their responses occur only when thirsty and not when satiated (Rolls, et al., 1989); and correspondingly 
in humans the pleasantness of the taste of water in the mouth is represented in the orbitofrontal cortex (de 
Araujo, Kringelbach, Rolls, & McGlone, 2003b). 
 
4.2. An olfactory representation in the orbitofrontal cortex. 
 A ventral frontal region has been implicated in olfactory processing in humans (Jones-Gotman & 
Zatorre, 1988; Zatorre, Jones-Gotman, Evans, & Meyer, 1992). Rolls and colleagues have analyzed the rules 
by which orbitofrontal olfactory representations are formed and operate in primates. For 65% of neurons in 
the orbitofrontal olfactory areas, Critchley and Rolls (1996b) showed that the representation of the olfactory 
stimulus was independent of its association with taste reward (analysed in an olfactory discrimination task 
with taste reward). For the remaining 35% of the neurons, the odors to which a neuron responded were 
influenced by the taste (glucose or saline) with which the odor was associated. Thus the odor representation 
for 35% of orbitofrontal neurons appeared to be built by olfactory-to-taste association learning. This 
possibility was confirmed by reversing the taste with which an odor was associated in the reversal of an 
olfactory discrimination task. It was found that 68% of the sample of neurons analysed altered the way in 
which they responded to odor when the taste reinforcement association of the odor was reversed (Rolls, et 
al., 1996b). The olfactory-to-taste reversal was quite slow, both neurophysiologically and behaviourally, 
often requiring 20-80 trials, consistent with the need for some stability of flavor representations. Thus the 
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rule according to which the orbitofrontal olfactory representation was formed was for some neurons by 
association learning with taste. 
 To analyse the nature of the olfactory representation in the orbitofrontal cortex, Critchley and Rolls 
(1996a) measured the responses of olfactory neurons that responded to food while they fed the monkey to 
satiety. They found that the majority of orbitofrontal olfactory neurons decreased their responses to the odor 
of the food with which the monkey was fed to satiety (see example in Fig. 5). Thus for these neurons, the 
reward value of the odor is what is represented in the orbitofrontal cortex (cf. Rolls & Rolls, 1997). In that 
the neuronal responses decreased to the food with which the monkey is fed to satiety, and may even increase 
to a food with which the monkey has not been fed, it is the relative reward value of stimuli that is represented 
by these orbitofrontal cortex neurons (cf. Schultz, Tremblay, & Hollerman, 2000), and this parallels the 
changes in the relative pleasantness of different foods after a food is eaten to satiety (Rolls, Rolls, Rowe, & 
Sweeney, 1981a; Rolls, Rolls, Rowe, & Sweeney, 1981b; Rolls, 1997; see Rolls, 1999a, 2000d, 2014a).
 Although individual neurons do not encode large amounts of information about which of 7-9 odors 
has been presented  (Rolls, Critchley, & Treves, 1996c), we have shown that the information does increase 
linearly with the number of neurons in the sample (Rolls, Critchley, Verhagen, & Kadohisa, 2010a). This 
ensemble encoding does result in useful amounts of information about which odor has been presented being 
provided by orbitofrontal cortex olfactory neurons. 
 Corresponding to the findings in non-human primate single neuron neurophysiology, in human 
neuroimaging experiments it has been shown that there is an orbitofrontal cortex area activated by olfactory 
stimuli (Francis, et al., 1999; Jones-Gotman & Zatorre, 1988; Zatorre, et al., 1992). Moreover, the 
pleasantness or reward value of odor is represented in the orbitofrontal cortex, in that feeding the humans to 
satiety decreases the activation found to the odor of that food, and this effect is relatively specific to the food 
eaten in the meal (Howard, Gottfried, Tobler, & Kahnt, 2015; O'Doherty, et al., 2000).  
Importantly, the human medial orbitofrontal cortex has activation that is linearly related to the 
subjective pleasantness of a set of odors, and a more lateral area has activation that is related to the degree of 
subjective unpleasantness of odors (Rolls, et al., 2003b).  In contrast, in primary olfactory cortical areas the 
activations reflected the intensity of the odors (Rolls, et al., 2003b). 
 In humans, the separate representations of pleasant and unpleasant odors appear to respond 
differently to hedonically complex odor mixtures that contain pleasant and unpleasant components. In brain 
areas such as the medial orbitofrontal cortex that represent pleasant odors, unpleasant components in the 
mixture were minimized and pleasant components were emphasized. In brain areas such as the mid 
orbitofrontal cortex that represent unpleasant odors, unpleasant components were emphasized more 
(Grabenhorst, Rolls, Margot, da Silva, & Velazco, 2007). An implication is that the system may be able to 
represent simultaneously the pleasantness and unpleasantness of odor mixtures.  Part of the interest of this is 
that interesting affective phenomena can arise with odor mixtures. For example, though musk and indole are 
unpleasant on their own, their presence in a complex mixture may not be unpleasant, and indeed may 
enhance the pleasantness (Grabenhorst, et al., 2007). Moreover, the separate and simultaneous 
representations of the positive and negative hedonic value of a complex affective stimulus may be important 
for affective decision-making in the brain, in that separate representations of different affective components 
of the same sensory stimulus may provide the inputs for making a decision about whether to choose the 
stimulus or not. 
 
4.3. Convergence of taste and olfactory inputs in the orbitofrontal cortex: the representation of flavor. 
 In the orbitofrontal cortex, not only unimodal taste neurons, but also unimodal olfactory neurons are 
found. In addition some single neurons respond to both gustatory and olfactory stimuli, often with 
correspondence between the two modalities (Rolls & Baylis, 1994). It is probably here in the orbitofrontal 
cortex of primates including humans that these two modalities converge to produce the representation of 
flavor (de Araujo, et al., 2003c; Rolls & Baylis, 1994), for neurons in the primary taste cortex in the 
insular/frontal opercular cortex do not respond to olfactory (or visual) stimuli (Verhagen, Kadohisa, & Rolls, 
2004). Evidence will soon be described that indicates that these representations are built by olfactory-
gustatory association learning, an example of stimulus-reinforcer association learning. 
The importance of the combination of taste and smell for producing affectively pleasant and 
rewarding representations of sensory stimuli is exemplified by findings with umami, the delicious taste or 
flavor that is associated with combinations of components that include meat, fish, milk, tomatoes, and 
mushrooms, all of which are rich in umami-related substances such as glutamate or inosine 
5’monophosphate. Umami taste is produced by glutamate acting on a fifth taste system (Chaudhari, 2013; 
Chaudhari, Landin, & Roper, 2000; Chaudhari, Pereira, & Roper, 2009; Maruyama, Pereira, Margolskee, 
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Chaudhari, & Roper, 2006; Rolls, 2009b; Zhao, et al., 2003). However, glutamate presented alone as a taste 
stimulus is not highly pleasant, and does not act synergistically with other tastes (sweet, salt, bitter and sour). 
However, when glutamate is given in combination with a consonant, savory, odor (vegetable), the resulting 
flavor can be much more pleasant (McCabe & Rolls, 2007). We showed using functional brain imaging with 
fMRI that this glutamate taste and savory odor combination produced much greater activation of the medial 
orbitofrontal cortex and pregenual cingulate cortex than the sum of the activations by the taste and olfactory 
components presented separately (McCabe & Rolls, 2007). Supra-linear effects were much less (and 
significantly less) evident for sodium chloride and vegetable odor. Further, activations in these brain regions 
were correlated with the pleasantness and fullness of the flavor, and with the consonance of the taste and 
olfactory components. Supra-linear effects of glutamate taste and savory odor were not found in the insular 
primary taste cortex. We thus proposed that glutamate acts by the non-linear effects it can produce when 
combined with a consonant odor in multimodal cortical taste-olfactory convergence regions. We suggested 
that umami can be thought of as a rich and delicious flavor that is produced by a combination of glutamate 
taste and a consonant savory odor. Glutamate is thus a flavor enhancer because of the way that it can 
combine supra-linearly with consonant odors in cortical areas where the taste and olfactory pathways 
converge far beyond the receptors (McCabe & Rolls, 2007). 
 
4.4. Oral texture and temperature 
 Some neurons in the macaque orbitofrontal cortex respond to the texture of food in the mouth. Some 
neurons alter their responses when the texture of a food is modified by adding gelatine or methyl cellulose, 
or by partially liquefying a solid food such as apple (Critchley, Rolls, & Wakeman, 1993).  
Another population of orbitofrontal neurons responds when a fatty food such as cream is in the 
mouth. These neurons can also be activated by pure fat such as glyceryl trioleate, and by non-fat substances 
with a fat-like texture such as paraffin oil (hydrocarbon) and silicone oil (Si(CH3)2O)n). These neurons thus 
provide information by somatosensory pathways that a fatty food is in the mouth (Rolls, et al., 1999a). These 
inputs are perceived as pleasant when hungry, because of the utility of ingestion of foods that are likely to 
contain essential fatty acids and to have a high calorific value (Rolls, 2000d, 2014a, 2016d). Satiety 
produced by eating a fatty food, cream, can decrease the responses of orbitofrontal cortex neurons to the 
texture of fat in the mouth (Rolls, et al., 1999a).  
We have shown that the orbitofrontal cortex receives inputs from a number of different oral texture 
channels, which together provide a rich sensory representation of what is in the mouth. Using a set of stimuli 
in which viscosity was systematically altered (carboxymethylcellulose with viscosity in the range 10-10,000 
centiPoise), we have shown that some orbitofrontal cortex neurons encode fat texture independently of 
viscosity (by a physical parameter that varies with the slickness of fat) (Verhagen, et al., 2003); that other 
orbitofrontal cortex neurons encode the viscosity of the texture in the mouth (with some neurons tuned to 
viscosity, and others showing increasing or decrease firing rates as viscosity increases) (Rolls, et al., 2003d); 
and that other neurons have responses that indicate the presence of texture stimuli (such as grittiness and 
capsaicin) in the mouth independently of viscosity and slickness (Rolls, et al., 2003d). The ensemble (i.e. 
population, distributed) encoding of all these variables is illustrated by the different tuning to the set of 
stimuli of the two neurons shown in Fig. 4. 
 An overlapping population of orbitofrontal cortex neurons represents the temperature of what is in 
the mouth (Kadohisa, Rolls, & Verhagen, 2004).  
These single neuron recording studies thus provide clear evidence on the rich sensory representation 
of oral stimuli, and of their reward value, that is provided in the primate orbitofrontal cortex, and how this 
differs from what is represented in the primary taste cortex and in the amygdala (Kadohisa, et al., 2005). In a 
complementary human functional neuroimaging study, it has been shown that activation of parts of the 
orbitofrontal cortex, primary taste cortex, and mid-insular somatosensory region posterior to the insular taste 
cortex have activations that are related to the viscosity of what is in the mouth, and that there is in addition a 
medial prefrontal / cingulate area where the mouth feel of fat is represented (de Araujo & Rolls, 2004). Also, 
in humans, there is a representation of the temperature of what is in the mouth (Guest, et al., 2007). The oral 
temperature stimuli (cooled and warmed, 5, 20 and 50°C) activated the insular taste cortex (identified by 
glucose taste stimuli), a part of the somatosensory cortex, the orbitofrontal cortex, the anterior cingulate 
cortex, and the ventral striatum. Brain regions where activations correlated with the pleasantness ratings of 
the oral temperature stimuli included the orbitofrontal cortex and pregenual cingulate cortex. Part of the 
advantage of having a representation of oral temperature in these regions is that neurons can then encode 
combinations of taste, texture and oral temperature (Kadohisa, et al., 2004; Verhagen, et al., 2004). These 
combination-responsive neurons may provide the basis for particular combinations of temperature, taste, 
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texture and odor to be especially pleasant (Rolls, Wood, & Rolls, 1980; Rolls, 2014a); for sensory-specific 
satiety to apply to that combination but not necessarily to the components; and more generally for learning 
and perception to apply to that combination and not necessarily to the components (Rolls, 2014a, 2016a). 
 
5. Somatosensory and temperature inputs to the orbitofrontal cortex, and affective value 
 In addition to these oral somatosensory inputs to the orbitofrontal cortex, there are also 
somatosensory inputs from other parts of the body, and indeed an fMRI investigation we have performed in 
humans indicates that pleasant and painful touch stimuli to the hand produce greater activation of the 
orbitofrontal cortex relative to the somatosensory cortex than do affectively neutral stimuli (Francis, et al., 
1999; Rolls, et al., 2003c).  
Non-glabrous skin such as that on the forearm contains C fibre tactile afferents that respond to light 
moving touch (Olausson, et al., 2002). The orbitofrontal cortex is implicated in some of the affectively 
pleasant aspects of touch that may be mediated through C fibre tactile afferents, in that it is activated more 
by light touch to the forearm than by light touch to the glabrous skin (palm) of the hand (McCabe, Rolls, 
Bilderbeck, & McGlone, 2008; Rolls, 2010a; Rolls, 2015a). 
Warm and cold stimuli have affective components such as feeling pleasant or unpleasant, and these 
components may have survival value, for approach to warmth and avoidance of cold may be reinforcers or 
goals for action built into us during evolution to direct our behaviour to stimuli that are appropriate for 
survival. Understanding the brain processing that underlies these prototypical reinforcers provides a direct 
approach to understanding the brain mechanisms of emotion. In an fMRI investigation in humans, it was 
found that the mid-orbitofrontal and pregenual cingulate cortex and the ventral striatum have activations that 
are correlated with the subjective pleasantness ratings made to warm (41°C) and cold (12°C) stimuli, and 
combinations of warm and cold stimuli, applied to the hand (Rolls, Grabenhorst, & Parris, 2008b) (see Fig. 
6a-c). Activations in the lateral and some more anterior parts of the orbitofrontal cortex were correlated with 
the unpleasantness of the stimuli. In contrast, activations in the somatosensory cortex and ventral posterior 
insula were correlated with the intensity but not the pleasantness of the thermal stimuli (see Fig. 6d-f).  
A principle thus is that processing related to the affective value and associated subjective emotional 
experience of thermal stimuli that are important for survival is performed in different brain areas to those 
where activations are related to sensory properties of the stimuli such as their intensity. This conclusion 
appears to be the case for processing in a number of sensory modalities, including taste (Grabenhorst & 
Rolls, 2008; Grabenhorst, Rolls, & Bilderbeck, 2008a) and olfaction (Anderson, et al., 2003; Grabenhorst, et 
al., 2007; Rolls, et al., 2003b), and the finding with such prototypical stimuli as warm and cold (Rolls, et al., 
2008b) provides strong support for this principle (Rolls, 2014a, 2016a).  
 
6. Visual inputs to the orbitofrontal cortex; and visual stimulus-reinforcement association learning and 
reversal 
We have been able to show that there is a major visual input to many neurons in the orbitofrontal 
cortex, and that what is represented by these neurons is in many cases the reinforcement association of visual 
stimuli. The visual input is from the ventral, temporal lobe, visual stream concerned with “what” object is 
being seen (see Rolls, 2000a; Rolls, 2016a; Rolls & Deco, 2002). Many neurons in these temporal cortex 
visual areas have responses to objects or faces that are invariant with respect to size, position on the retina, 
and even view (Rolls, 2000a; Rolls, 2007c, 2008b; Rolls, 2012b; Rolls, 2016a; Rolls & Deco, 2002),  
making these neurons ideal as an input to a system that may learn about the reinforcement association 
properties of objects and faces, for after a single learning trial, the learning then generalizes correctly to other 
views etc. (see Rolls, 2000a; Rolls, 2014a, 2016a; Rolls & Deco, 2002). Using this object-related 
information, orbitofrontal cortex visual neurons frequently respond differentially to objects or images 
depending on their reward association (Rolls, et al., 1996b; Thorpe, et al., 1983). The primary reinforcer that 
has been used is taste, and correlates of visual to taste association learning have been demonstrated in the 
human orbitofrontal cortex with fMRI (O'Doherty, Deichmann, Critchley, & Dolan, 2002). Many of these 
neurons show visual-taste reversal in one or a very few trials (see example in Fig. 7). (In a visual 
discrimination task, they will reverse the stimulus to which they respond, from e.g., a triangle to a square, in 
one trial when the taste delivered for a behavioural response to that stimulus is reversed (Thorpe, et al., 
1983).) In principle, this could be implemented by associative modification of synapses conveying visual 
input onto taste-responsive neurons, implementing a pattern association network (Rolls, 2014a, 2016a). 
However, in primates, visual-to-taste reversal is so rapid that after a punishment has been received to the 
negative discriminative stimulus (S-), the next time that the previous S- is shown, the neurons respond to it 
as an S+, and the monkey chooses that stimulus (Rolls, et al., 1996b; Thorpe, et al., 1983). This is a non-
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associative process that involves a rule change, and this is a special contribution that the primate 
orbitofrontal cortex makes to reversal learning, and for which a computational theory that utilizes the 
conditional reward and error neurons has been produced (Deco & Rolls, 2005c). This theory provides an 
account of the utility of conditional reward neurons. The current rule must be held in short term memory, and 
this is one reason why a cortical structure, which can implement short-term memory, is involved in this rapid 
emotional learning used to rapidly update reward representations used for social and related behaviour based 
on inputs being received from the environment (Rolls, 2016a). A computational theory of how not receiving 
an expected reward reverses the rule neurons has been developed (Rolls & Deco, 2016). This reversal 
learning probably does occur in the orbitofrontal cortex, for it does not occur one synapse earlier in the visual 
inferior temporal cortex (Rolls, Judge, & Sanghera, 1977), and it is in the orbitofrontal cortex that there is 
convergence of visual and taste pathways onto the same single neurons (Rolls & Baylis, 1994; Rolls, et al., 
1996b; Thorpe, et al., 1983).  
 To analyse the nature of the visual representation of food-related stimuli in the orbitofrontal cortex, 
Critchley and Rolls (1996a) measured the responses of neurons that responded to the sight of food while they 
fed the monkey to satiety. They found that the majority of orbitofrontal visual food-related neurons 
decreased their responses to the sight of the food with which the monkey was fed to satiety (see example in 
Fig. 5). Thus for these neurons, the reward value of the sight of food is what is represented in the 
orbitofrontal cortex. In that the neuronal responses decreased to the food with which the monkey is fed to 
satiety, and may even increase to a food with which the monkey has not been fed, it is the relative reward 
value of stimuli that is represented by these orbitofrontal cortex neurons. At a stage of visual processing one 
synapse earlier, in the inferior temporal visual cortex, neurons do not show visual discrimination reversal 
learning, nor are their responses modulated by feeding to satiety (Rolls, et al., 1977). Thus both these 
functions involved in representing expected reward value are implemented for visual processing in the 
orbitofrontal cortex. 
 
7. Rewards are represented medially, and punishers and non-reward laterally, in the orbitofrontal 
cortex 
Many types of reward and punisher are represented in the human orbitofrontal cortex. For example, 
monetary reward is represented in the medial orbitofrontal cortex, and losing money in the lateral 
orbitofrontal cortex (O'Doherty, et al., 2001a). Beauty in a face is also represented in the medial orbitofrontal 
cortex (O'Doherty, et al., 2003). In addition, it has been shown that amphetamine, a potent instrumental 
reinforcer, is self-administered to the orbitofrontal cortex by macaques (Phillips, Mora, & Rolls, 1981), and 
that in drug naïve human participants amphetamine activates the medial orbitofrontal cortex (Völlm, et al., 
2004). Many rewards are represented medially in the orbitofrontal cortex, in areas 13 and 11, and many 
punishers and non-rewards are represented laterally in area 47/12, as shown in Fig. 8 (Grabenhorst & Rolls, 
2011; Rolls, 2014a). 
 
8. Orbitofrontal cortex negative reward prediction error neurons 
 In addition to the neurons that encode the expected reward value of visual stimuli, other, ‘error’, 
neurons in the orbitofrontal cortex detect non-reward, in that they respond for example when an expected 
reward is not obtained when a visual discrimination task is reversed (Thorpe, et al., 1983) (see Fig. 9), or 
when reward is no longer made available in a visual discrimination task. These neurons respond to a 
mismatch between the expected reward value (in this case signalled by the visual stimulus) and the reward 
outcome (in this case the taste). These neurons are thus termed “negative reward prediction error neurons” 
(Rolls, 2014a, 2016a; Rolls & Grabenhorst, 2008). Both signals needed for the computation are represented 
in the orbitofrontal cortex, in the form of for example neurons that respond to the sight of a learned 
reinforcer such as the sight of a stimulus paired with taste, and neurons that respond to the primary reinforcer 
(or outcome), the taste (or texture or temperature). The orbitofrontal cortex is the probable brain region for 
this computation, because both of the signals required to compute negative reward prediction error are 
present in the orbitofrontal cortex, so are the negative reward prediction error neurons, and lesions of the 
orbitofrontal cortex impair tasks such as visual discrimination reversal in which this type of negative reward 
prediction error is needed (see above). Different populations of such neurons respond to other types of non-
reward, including the removal of a formerly approaching taste reward, and the termination of a taste reward 
in the extinction of ad lib licking for juice, or the substitution of juice reward by aversive tasting saline 
during ad lib licking (Rolls & Grabenhorst, 2008; Thorpe, et al., 1983). The presence of these neurons is 
fully consistent with the hypothesis that they are part of the mechanism by which the orbitofrontal cortex 
enables very rapid reversal of behaviour by stimulus-reinforcement association relearning when the 
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association of stimuli with reinforcers is altered or reversed (Deco & Rolls, 2005c; Rolls & Deco, 2016).  
The finding that different orbitofrontal cortex neurons respond to different types of non-reward (or negative 
reward prediction error) (Thorpe, et al., 1983) may provide part of the brain’s mechanism that enables task or 
context-specific reversal to occur.  
Evidence that there may be similar error neurons in the human orbitofrontal cortex is that in a model 
of social learning, orbitofrontal cortex activation occurred in a visual discrimination reversal task at the time 
when the face of one person no longer was associated with a smile, but became associated with an angry 
expression, indicating on such error trials that reversal of choice to the other individual’s face should occur 
(Kringelbach & Rolls, 2003) (Fig. 10a). Consistent with this evidence for humans, functional neuroimaging 
in macaques reveals that the macaque lateral orbitofrontal cortex is activated by non-reward during a reversal 
task (Chau, et al., 2015) (Fig. 10c). 
It may be noted that the dopamine neurons in the midbrain may not be able to provide a good 
representation of negative reward prediction error, because their spontaneous firing rates are so low (Schultz, 
2004) that much further reduction would provide only a small signal. In any case, the dopamine neurons 
would not appear to be in a position to compute a reward prediction error, as they are not known to receive 
inputs that signal expected reward, and the actual reward (outcome) that is obtained, and indeed do not 
represent the reward obtained (or ‘outcome’), in that they stop responding to a taste reward outcome if it is 
predictable. Although dopamine neurons do appear to represent a positive reward prediction error signal 
(responding if a greater than expected reward is obtained as the outcome) (Schultz, 2004, 2006, 2013, 2016), 
they do not appear to have the signals required to compute this, the expected reward, and the reward outcome 
obtained, so even this must be computed elsewhere. The orbitofrontal cortex does contain representations of 
these two signals, the expected reward and the reward outcome, and has projections to the ventral striatum, 
which in turn projects in part via the habenula to the region of the midbrain dopamine neurons, and so this is 
one possible pathway along which the firing of positive reward prediction error might be computed (see Fig. 
2) (Rolls, 2017c). Consistent with this, activations in parts of the human ventral striatum are related to 
positive reward prediction error (Hare, O'Doherty, Camerer, Schultz, & Rangel, 2008; Rolls, McCabe, & 
Redoute, 2008e). Thus the dopamine projections to the prefrontal cortex and other areas are not likely to 
convey information about reward to the prefrontal cortex, which instead is likely to be decoded by the 
neurons in the orbitofrontal cortex that represent primary reinforcers, and the orbitofrontal cortex neurons 
that learn associations of other stimuli to the primary reinforcers to represent expected value (Rolls, 2014a, 
2016a; Rolls, et al., 1996b; Rolls, et al., 2008e; Thorpe, et al., 1983).  
 In responding when the reward obtained is less than that expected, the orbitofrontal cortex negative 
reward prediction error neurons are working in a domain that is related to the sensory inputs being received 
(expected reward and reward obtained). There are also error neurons in the anterior cingulate cortex that 
respond when errors are made (Niki & Watanabe, 1979), or when rewards are reduced (Shima & Tanji, 
1998) (and in similar imaging studies, Bush, et al., 2002). Some of these neurons may be influenced by the 
projections from the orbitofrontal cortex, and reflect a mismatch between the reward expected and the 
reward that is obtained. However, some error neurons in the anterior cingulate cortex may reflect errors that 
arise when particular actions are in error, and this type of error may be important in helping an action system 
to correct itself, rather than, as in the orbitofrontal cortex, a reward prediction system needs to be corrected.  
Consistent with this, many studies provide evidence that errors made in many tasks activate the 
anterior/midcingulate cortex, whereas tasks with response conflict activate the superior frontal gyrus 
(Matsumoto, Matsumoto, Abe, & Tanaka, 2007; Rushworth & Behrens, 2008; Rushworth, Walton, 
Kennerley, & Bannerman, 2004; Vogt, 2009).  
   
8. Face-selective processing in the orbitofrontal cortex 
 Another type of visual information represented in the orbitofrontal cortex is information about faces. 
There is a population of orbitofrontal cortex neurons that respond in many ways similar to those in the 
temporal cortical visual areas (Rolls, 1984, 1992, 1996; Rolls, 2000a; Rolls, 2007c, 2008b; Rolls, 2012b; 
Rolls, 2014a, 2016a; Rolls & Deco, 2002). The orbitofrontal face-responsive neurons, first observed by 
Thorpe, Rolls and Maddison (1983), then by Rolls et al. (2006), tend to respond with longer latencies than 
temporal lobe neurons (140-200 ms typically, compared to 80-100 ms); also convey information about which 
face is being seen, by having different responses to different faces; and are typically rather harder to activate 
strongly than temporal cortical face-selective neurons, in that many of them respond much better to real faces 
than to two-dimensional images of faces on a video monitor (cf. Rolls & Baylis, 1986). Some of the 
orbitofrontal cortex face-selective neurons are responsive to face expression, gesture or movement (Rolls, 
2007c, 2008b, 2011b; Rolls, et al., 2006). The findings are consistent with the likelihood that these neurons 
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are activated via the inputs from the temporal cortical visual areas in which face-selective neurons are found 
(see Figs. 2 and 3). The significance of the neurons is likely to be related to the fact that faces convey 
information that is important in social reinforcement in at least two ways that could be implemented by these 
neurons. The first is that some may encode face expression (Rolls, et al., 2006) (cf. Hasselmo, et al., 1989), 
which can indicate reinforcement. The second way is that they encode information about which individual is 
present (Rolls, et al., 2006), which by stimulus-reinforcement association learning is important in evaluating 
and utilising learned reinforcing inputs in social situations, e.g., about the current reinforcement value as 
decoded by stimulus-reinforcement association, to a particular individual. When reversal learning was tested 
by altering the food reward with which each of two faces was associated, two neurons stopped responding 
differently to the two faces, and three neurons were not affected by the reversal learning (Critchley, 1994; 
Rolls, et al., 2006). The two neurons that changed their response during the reversal learning are termed 
‘conditional reward neurons’, and are important to reversal learning (Deco & Rolls, 2005c; Rolls, 2014a). 
 This system has also been shown to be present in humans. For example, Kringelbach and Rolls 
(2003) showed that activation of a part of the human orbitofrontal cortex occurs during a face discrimination 
reversal task. In the task, the faces of two different individuals are shown, and when the correct face is 
selected, the expression turns into a smile. (The expression turns to angry if the wrong face is selected.) After 
a period of correct performance, the contingencies reverse, and the other face must be selected to obtain a 
smile expression as a reinforcer. It was found that activation of a part of the orbitofrontal cortex occurred 
specifically in relation to the reversal, that is when a formerly correct face was chosen, but an angry face 
expression was obtained (Fig. 10c). In a control task, it was shown that the activations were not related just 
to showing an angry face expression.  Thus in humans, there is a part of the orbitofrontal cortex that responds 
selectively in relation to face expression specifically when it indicates that behavior should change, and this 
activation is error-related (Kringelbach & Rolls, 2003) and occurs when the error neurons in the orbitofrontal 
cortex become active (Thorpe, et al., 1983). 
 Also prompted by the neuronal recording evidence of face and auditory neurons in the orbitofrontal 
cortex (Rolls, et al., 2006), it has further been shown that there are impairments in the identification of facial 
and vocal emotional expression in a group of patients with ventral frontal lobe damage who had socially 
inappropriate behaviour (Hornak, Rolls, & Wade, 1996). The expression identification impairments could 
occur independently of perceptual impairments in facial recognition, voice discrimination, or environmental 
sound recognition. Poor performance on both expression tests was correlated with the degree of alteration of 
emotional experience reported by the patients. There was also a strong positive correlation between the 
degree of altered emotional experience and the severity of the behavioural problems (e.g., disinhibition) 
found in these patients (Hornak, et al., 1996). A comparison group of patients with brain damage outside the 
ventral frontal lobe region, without these behavioural problems, was unimpaired on the face expression 
identification test, was significantly less impaired at vocal expression identification, and reported little 
subjective emotional change (Hornak, et al., 1996). It has further been shown that patients with discrete 
surgical lesions of restricted parts of the orbitofrontal cortex may have face and/or voice expression 
identification impairments, and these are likely to contribute to their difficulties in social situations (Hornak, 
et al., 2003).  
 
9. Top-down effects of cognition and attention on taste, olfactory, flavor, somatosensory, and visual 
processing: cognitive enhancement of the value of affective stimuli 
 How does cognition influence affective value? How does cognition influence the way that we feel 
emotionally? Do cognition and emotion interact in regions that are high in the brain’s hierarchy of 
processing, or do cognitive influences descend down to influence the first regions that represent the affective 
value of stimuli? 
An fMRI study to address these fundamental issues in brain design has shown that cognitive effects 
can reach down into the human orbitofrontal cortex and influence activations produced by odors (de Araujo, 
et al., 2005). In this study, a standard test odor, isovaleric acid with a small amount of cheese flavor, was 
delivered through an olfactometer. (The odor alone, like the odor of brie, might have been interpreted as 
pleasant, or perhaps as unpleasant.) On some trials the test odor was accompanied with the visually presented 
word label “cheddar cheese”, and on other trials with the word label “body odor”. It was found that the 
activation in the medial orbitofrontal cortex to the standard test odor was much greater when the word label 
was cheddar cheese than when it was body odor. (Controls with clean air were run to show that the effect 
could not be accounted for by the word label alone.) Moreover, the word labels influenced the subjective 
pleasantness ratings to the test odor, and the changing pleasantness ratings were correlated with the 
activations in the human medial orbitofrontal cortex. Part of the interest and importance of this finding is that 
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it shows that cognitive influences, originating here purely at the word level, can reach down and modulate 
activations in the first stage of cortical processing that represents the affective value of sensory stimuli (de 
Araujo, et al., 2005; Rolls, 2014a). 
 Also important is how cognition influences the affective brain representations of the taste and flavor 
of a food. This is important not only for understanding top-down influences in the brain, but also in relation 
to the topical issues of appetite control and obesity (Rolls, 2007d, 2007e, 2016d). In an fMRI study it was 
shown that activations related to the affective value of umami taste and flavor (as shown by correlations with 
pleasantness ratings) in the orbitofrontal cortex were modulated by word-level descriptors (e.g. “rich and 
delicious flavor”) (Grabenhorst, et al., 2008a) (see Fig. 11). Affect-related activations to taste were 
modulated in a region that receives from the orbitofrontal cortex, the pregenual cingulate cortex, and to taste 
and flavor in another region that receives from the orbitofrontal cortex, the ventral striatum. Affect-related 
cognitive modulations were not found in the insular taste cortex, where the intensity but not the pleasantness 
of the taste was represented. Thus the top-down language-level cognitive effects reach far down into the 
earliest cortical areas that represent the appetitive value of taste and flavor. This is an important way in 
which cognition influences the neural mechanisms that control appetite. 
When we see a person being touched, we may empathize the feelings being produced by the touch. 
Interestingly, cognitive modulation of this effect can be produced. When subjects were informed by word 
labels that a cream seen being rubbed onto the forearm was a “Rich moisturising cream” vs “Basic cream”, 
these cognitive labels influenced activations in the orbitofrontal / pregenual cingulate cortex and ventral 
striatum to the sight of touch and their correlations with the pleasantness ratings (McCabe, et al., 2008). 
Some evidence for top-down cognitive modulation of the effects produced by the subject being rubbed with 
the cream was found in brain regions such as the orbitofrontal and pregenual cingulate cortex and ventral 
striatum, but some effects were found in other brain regions, perhaps reflecting backprojections from the 
orbitofrontal cortex (McCabe, et al., 2008). 
 What may be a fundamental principle of how top-down attention can influence affective vs non-
affective processing has been discovered. For an identical taste stimulus, paying attention to pleasantness 
activated some brain systems, and paying attention to intensity, which reflected the physical and not the 
affective properties of the stimulus, activated other brain systems (Grabenhorst & Rolls, 2008). In an fMRI 
investigation, when subjects were instructed to remember and rate the pleasantness of a taste stimulus, 0.1 M 
monosodium glutamate, activations were greater in the medial orbitofrontal and pregenual cingulate cortex 
than when subjects were instructed to remember and rate the intensity of the taste (Fig. 12a-c). When the 
subjects were instructed to remember and rate the intensity, activations were greater in the insular taste 
cortex (Fig. 12d-f). (Consistent with this role in representing what taste may be present independently of its 
affective value, trying to detect the presence of taste in a tasteless solution resulted in enhanced activity in 
the taste insula and overlying operculum but not the orbitofrontal cortex (Veldhuizen, Bender, Constable, & 
Small, 2007). For comparison, the orbitofrontal cortex responded preferentially during receipt of an 
unpredicted taste stimulus (Veldhuizen, et al., 2007), and this could be related to emotional effects, or to 
novelty which is represented in the orbitofrontal cortex.) Thus, depending on the context in which tastes are 
presented and whether affect is relevant, the brain responds to a taste differently. These findings show that 
when attention is paid to affective value, the brain systems engaged to represent the sensory stimulus of taste 
are different from those engaged when attention is directed to the physical properties of a stimulus such as its 
intensity. This differential biasing of brain regions engaged in processing a sensory stimulus depending on 
whether the attentional demand is for affect-related vs more sensory-related processing may be an important 
aspect of cognition and attention. This has many implications for understanding attentional effects to 
affective value not only on taste, but also on other sensory stimuli. 
 Indeed, the concept has been validated in the olfactory system too. In an fMRI investigation, when 
subjects were instructed to remember and rate the pleasantness of a jasmin odor, activations were greater in 
the medial orbitofrontal and pregenual cingulate cortex than when subjects were instructed to remember and 
rate the intensity of the odor (Rolls, Grabenhorst, Margot, da Silva, & Velazco, 2008a). When the subjects 
were instructed to remember and rate the intensity, activations were greater in the inferior frontal gyrus. 
These top-down effects occurred not only during odor delivery, but started in a preparation period after the 
instruction before odor delivery, and continued after termination of the odor in a short term memory period. 
Thus, depending on the context in which odors are presented and whether affect is relevant, the brain 
prepares itself, responds to, and remembers an odor differently. These findings show that when attention is 
paid to affective value, the brain systems engaged to prepare for, represent, and remember a sensory stimulus 
are different from those engaged when attention is directed to the physical properties of a stimulus such as its 
intensity. This differential biasing of brain regions engaged in processing a sensory stimulus depending on 
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whether the cognitive demand is for affect-related vs more sensory-related processing may be important for 
understanding how the context can influence how we process stimuli that may have affective properties, how 
different people may respond differently to stimuli if they process the stimuli in different ways, and more 
generally, how attentional set can influence the processing of affective stimuli by influencing processing in 
for example the orbitofrontal cortex and related areas. 
The principle thus appears to be that top-down attentional and cognitive effects on affective value 
influence representations selectively in cortical areas that process the affective value and associated 
subjective emotional experience of taste (Grabenhorst & Rolls, 2008; Grabenhorst, et al., 2008a) and 
olfactory (Anderson, et al., 2003; Grabenhorst, et al., 2007; Rolls, et al., 2003b) stimuli in brain regions such 
as the orbitofrontal cortex; whereas top-down attentional and cognitive effects on intensity  influence 
representations in brain areas that process the intensity and identity of the stimulus such as the primary taste 
and olfactory cortical areas (Anderson, et al., 2003; Grabenhorst & Rolls, 2008; Grabenhorst, et al., 2008a; 
Grabenhorst, et al., 2007; Rolls, et al., 2003b). This is computationally appropriate in top-down biased 
competition models of attention (Deco & Rolls, 2005a; Rolls, 2016a; Rolls & Deco, 2002). However, we 
note that in one study a cognitive label that increased the pleasantness of an odor did have some effect in 
primary olfactory areas such as the olfactory tubercle, though in that study the general principle was still 
evident, that odors independently of their pleasantness have strong effects on the primary olfactory areas, 
whereas pleasantness vs unpleasantness are selectively (and separately) represented in areas such as the 
orbitofrontal cortex (de Araujo, et al., 2005).  
 The mechanisms that underlie these top-down attentional and cognitive effects include top-down 
biased competition and biased activation of the bottom-up (sensory) effects, and are now starting to be 
elucidated computationally (Deco & Rolls, 2005b; Desimone & Duncan, 1995; Rolls, 2008d; Rolls, 2013a, 
2014a, 2016a; Rolls & Deco, 2002). 
 
10. A representation of novel visual stimuli in the orbitofrontal cortex. 
 A population of neurons has been discovered in the primate orbitofrontal cortex that responds to 
novel but not familiar visual stimuli, and takes typically a few trials to habituate (Rolls, Browning, Inoue, & 
Hernadi, 2005). The memories of these neurons last for at least 24 h. Exactly what role these neurons have in 
memory is not yet known, but there are connections from the area in which these neurons are recorded to the 
temporal lobe, and activations in a corresponding orbitofrontal cortex area in humans are found when new 
visual stimuli must be encoded in memory (Frey & Petrides, 2002, 2003; Petrides, 2007). 
 
11. Emotion and the orbitofrontal cortex 
 From earlier approaches (Gray, 1975; Millenson, 1967; Weiskrantz, 1968), Rolls has developed the 
theory over a series of stages that emotions are states elicited by instrumental reinforcers1 (Rolls, 1986a, 
1986b, 1990; Rolls, 1999a; Rolls, 1999b; Rolls, 2000b; Rolls, 2014a). Given that the evidence described 
above indicates that primary (unlearned) reinforcers, such as taste, touch, oral texture, are made explicit in 
the representations in the orbitofrontal cortex, there is a basis for understanding part of the role of the 
orbitofrontal cortex in emotion. (By made explicit, I mean that the firing rate of the neurons is related to what 
is being represented (Rolls, 2016a), for example the reward value of taste by a neuron that responds to sweet 
taste only when hunger is present and there is an appetite for the taste.)  
Further, the evidence described above indicates that associations between previously neutral stimuli 
such as a visual stimulus with primary reinforcers are formed and rapidly reversed in the orbitofrontal cortex, 
and thus the orbitofrontal cortex is likely because of this to have important functions in emotions that are 
produced by these secondary (learned) reinforcers. For example, the ability to perform this learning very 
rapidly is probably very important in social situations in primates, in which reinforcing stimuli are 
continually being exchanged, and the reinforcement value of stimuli must be continually updated (relearned), 
based on the actual reinforcers received and given. This type of learning also allows the stimuli or events that 
give rise to emotions and are represented in the orbitofrontal cortex to be quite abstract and general, 
including for example working for ‘points’ or for monetary reward, as shown by visual discrimination 
reversal deficits in patients with orbitofrontal cortex lesions working for these rewards (Berlin, Rolls, & 
Kischka, 2004; Fellows, 2007; Fellows & Farah, 2003, 2005; Hornak, et al., 2004; Rolls, Hornak, Wade, & 
                         
 1For the purposes of this paper, a positive reinforcer or reward can be defined as a stimulus that the 
animal will work to obtain, and a punisher as a stimulus that will reduce the probability of an action on 
which it is contingent or that an animal will work to avoid or escape (see further Rolls (2014a)). 
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McGrath, 1994a), and activation of different parts of the human orbitofrontal cortex by monetary gain vs. 
loss (O'Doherty, et al., 2001a), and other reinforcers (Kringelbach & Rolls, 2004). 
To help clarify some of the fundamental ways in which emotion is linked to instrumental reinforcers, 
but not to all properties of stimuli that happen to be rewards or punishers, and as a guide to further research, 
it is useful to specify some important points about Rolls’ theory of emotion (Rolls, 2014a).  
First, the theory specifies that it is instrumental reinforcers, which specify the goals for action, that 
produce emotions. The theory is set in an evolutionary, Darwinian context, for it holds that the specification 
by genes of a set of primary reinforcers (such as sweet taste when hungry, affiliative touch, pain, attachment, 
altruism) is an efficient way for genes to direct adaptive behaviour, and is much more efficient than 
specifying actions (such as climbing a tree when an apple is seen, reaching for the apple, and putting it in the 
mouth). By specifying the goals for action, the process allows the actual behaviour required to obtain the 
goal to be learned, providing great flexibility in the actions. The actual emotion that is produced by the 
reinforcer depends on the contingency (delivery of a reward or punisher; omission or termination of a reward 
or punisher); on the primary reinforcer; and on the particular secondary reinforcer (Rolls, 2014a). The point 
made here is that it is by virtue of being a goal for action that instrumental reinforcers produce emotions. A 
stimulus that happens to be an instrumental reinforcer may be able to produce many other effects, and 
disrupting these other effects might not alter emotions. This is important when interpreting the effects of 
brain damage on emotion and reinforcers: it is only the goal-related aspect of the reinforcing stimulus that 
the theory holds is closely related to emotion (Rolls, 2014a). An example comes from considering autonomic 
responses. An instrumental reinforcer such as sweet taste when hungry will produce autonomic responses 
such as salivation (and these can be classically conditioned). But the mechanisms and brain’s circuitry for 
producing salivation, and more generally for classical (Pavlovian) conditioning (see section 3.2 of Rolls, 
2016a), may be quite different from the circuitry involved in specifying a stimulus as a goal for action, and 
performing action-outcome instrumental learning (where outcome refers to whether the reinforcer, the goal 
for action, is received). (This highlights how different Rolls’ theory of emotion (Rolls, 2014a) is to that of 
Damasio (1994), who argues that emotions are related to autonomic feedback, and his theory is not based on 
the concept of emotions as being states elicited by instrumental reinforcers.) Evidence that autonomic effects 
are not required for emotions (Rolls, 2014a) includes findings that patients with peripheral autonomic failure 
do not suffer from disrupted emotions (Heims, Critchley, Dolan, Mathias, & Cipolotti, 2004).  
Reinforcing stimuli may produce many other effects (Rolls, 2014a, 2016a), including informational 
in which they may not be acting as a goal for an action (Murray & Izquierdo, 2007), Pavlovian Instrumental 
Transfer in which a classically conditioned stimulus may enhance instrumental behaviour (Cardinal, 
Parkinson, Hall, & Everitt, 2002), incentive effects in which reward devaluation outside the instrumental task 
may not immediately influence the goal value with respect to instrumental actions (Balleine & Dickinson, 
1998), etc (Cardinal, et al., 2002), and these will only be related to emotion in so far as they influence the 
goal-related aspects of the stimulus for instrumental behaviour. In summary, we would expect a close link 
between the goal-related aspects of the reinforcing stimulus and emotion, but not necessarily between other 
effects produced by stimuli that happen to be instrumental reinforcers, or produce classically conditioned 
effects (see section 3.2 of Rolls, 2014a; Rolls, 2016a). It is important to appreciate this when assessing 
whether there are in fact any dissociations between brain mechanisms involved in emotion and brain 
mechanisms that are involved in instrumental learning where the stimulus acts as a goal for action as in 
action-outcome learning (cf. Murray & Izquierdo, 2007). In so far as classical (Pavlovian) conditioning can 
influence instrumental actions, for example in some of the ways described above, then this type of learning 
can play a role in emotion, and indeed the amygdala has been implicated in some of these classically 
conditioned effects on emotion (Cardinal, et al., 2002; Rolls, 2014a; Seymour & Dolan, 2008). Further, in so 
far as stimulus-reinforcer association learning (also known as stimulus-outcome learning, where the outcome 
is the reinforcer) is essential for defining the goals for action when the stimulus is associated by learning 
with a reinforcer, then this is very important in emotion, and neurons in the orbitofrontal cortex learn this 
type of association, and can reverse it rapidly, and this is a fundamental role that the orbitofrontal cortex 
plays in emotion. The use of these goals identified by associative learning for association with action to 
implement action-outcome learning is a process that we identify in this review as taking place beyond the 
orbitofrontal cortex, in structures to which it projects such as the anterior cingulate cortex.  
 To make the point in everyday language, Rolls’ theory (2014a) holds that emotions are states elicited 
by goals (which are reinforcers). Does not this resonate with common understanding of emotions? Do we not 
have emotions when we attain our goals; and if we do not? 
 We may note that it is not an improvement to the theory to hold that the goal for which the animal or 
human works is the emotional state, for this does not provide an answer, but immediately leads to the 
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questions: What is it that accounts for these emotional states? Why and how are emotions related to goals for 
action? How are emotional states selected for in evolution so that they are produced by something in the 
environment? That approach would not provide an explanation, but would just raise questions. It is much 
clearer to hold that instrumental reinforcers are selected in evolution to be the goals for action because they 
are a way for genes to specify useful goals in terms of survival value; and then to note that the states elicited 
by these instrumental reinforcers are emotional states (Rolls, 2014a). Unless exceptions are found to this rule 
(that instrumental reinforcers in their goal-related effects produce emotional states, and that emotional states 
are produced by instrumental reinforcers in their goal-related effects), then this seems a powerful account of 
emotions (Rolls, 2014a). 
 Second, action-outcome learning, not habit learning, even though the latter is instrumental, is what 
the theory holds is related to emotion (Rolls, 2014a). If a rewarded behaviour is performed for a large 
number of trials, it becomes a habit and may be implemented by stimulus-response associations that are 
formed in brain regions such as the basal ganglia (Rolls, 2014a). After such overlearning, the behaviour may 
be performed rather automatically and calmly, without much emotion, as in a well-learned active avoidance 
task. It is therefore argued that instrumental behaviour when performed in this automated way by a ‘habit’ 
system does not require the type of processing that is related to emotion. On the other hand, while the 
instrumental behaviour is being learned, associations are being formed between actions and outcomes, and 
the outcomes are being tested to see whether they meet the goals. Thus in action-outcome learning the goals 
are being explicitly processed and are instrumental reinforcers, and are being met or not, and it is in these 
conditions of goal-related events that the theory holds that emotions arise (Rolls, 2014a). 
Third, the instrumental reinforcer and the emotion correspond. If a food reward is not given, the 
emotional state will be different from when a social reinforcer is not given, or when a monetary reward is not 
given (Rolls, 2014a). As there is some dissociation between brain systems involved in processing different 
instrumental reinforcers, the prediction is that a particular emotion will only be impaired if the relevant brain 
system involved in representing the goals or instrumental reinforcers involved in that particular emotion are 
impaired. It would of course be necessary to test cases where this correspondence of instrumental reinforcer 
and the emotion being measured applies in order to test whether instrumental reinforcers are linked to 
emotional states. It would be important to consider this when assessing the effects of lesions on emotion (cf. 
Murray & Izquierdo, 2007). 
 
12. Effects of damage to and dysfunction of the human orbitofrontal cortex 
In humans, euphoria, irresponsibility, lack of affect, and impulsiveness can follow frontal lobe 
damage (Damasio, 1994; Kolb & Whishaw, 2003; Rolls, 1999a), particularly orbitofrontal damage (Berlin, 
Rolls, & Iversen, 2005; Berlin, et al., 2004; Hornak, et al., 2003; Hornak, et al., 1996; Rolls, 1999a; Rolls, 
2014a; Rolls, et al., 1994a), and the human literature is considered further below. These emotional changes 
may be related at least in part to a failure to rapidly update the reinforcement associations of stimuli when the 
contingencies are changed as in a visual discrimination reversal task (Fellows & Farah, 2003; Hornak, et al., 
2004; Rolls, 1999b, 2014a; Rolls, et al., 1994a). Similar mechanisms may contribute at least in part to the 
poor performance of humans with ventromedial prefrontal cortex damage on the Iowa Gambling Task 
(Bechara, Damasio, & Damasio, 2000; Maia & McClelland, 2004). 
 The evidence from the effects of lesions to the orbitofrontal cortex indicates that there are close links 
between representing reinforcers, rapidly changing learned associations to reinforcers, and emotion including 
subjective emotional states. For example patients with damage to the orbitofrontal cortex may be impaired at 
decoding face and voice expression (which are social reinforcers) (Hornak, et al., 2003; Hornak, et al., 1996; 
Rolls, 1999b), in reversing stimulus-reward associations (Berlin, et al., 2004; Fellows, 2007; Fellows & 
Farah, 2003, 2005; Hornak, et al., 2004; Rolls, et al., 1994a), and in emotional behavior and subjective 
emotional states (Hornak, et al., 2003; Rolls, et al., 1994a). To provide more detail, patients with discrete 
surgical lesions producing bilateral orbitofrontal cortex damage who were impaired at the visual 
discrimination reversal task had high scores on parts of a Social Behaviour Questionnaire in which the 
patients were rated on behaviours such as emotion recognition in others (e.g. their sad, angry, or disgusted 
mood); in interpersonal relationships (such as not caring what others think, and not being close to the 
family); emotional empathy (e.g. when others are happy, is not happy for them); interpersonal relationships 
(e.g. does not care what others think, and is not close to his family); public behaviour (is uncooperative); 
antisocial behaviour (is critical of and impatient with others); impulsivity (does things without thinking); and 
sociability (is not sociable, and has difficulty making or maintaining close relationships) (Hornak, et al., 
2003), all of which could reflect less behavioural sensitivity to different types of punishment and reward. 
Further, in a Subjective Emotional Change Questionnaire in which the patients reported on any changes in 
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the intensity and/or frequency of their own experience of emotions, the bilateral orbitofrontal cortex lesion 
patients with deficits in the visual discrimination reversal task reported a number of changes, including 
changes in sadness, anger, fear and happiness (Hornak, et al., 2003). Further evidence on these close links 
(Hornak, et al., 1996; Rolls, 2016a; Rolls, et al., 1994a) provides further support for the theory that because 
the orbitofrontal cortex decodes and represents reinforcers, and updates the representations by rapid learning, 
it is an important brain region for emotion. 
 The changes in emotion produced by damage to the orbitofrontal cortex are large, as the evidence 
described above shows. The importance of the orbitofrontal cortex in emotion in humans is emphasized by a 
comparison with the effects of bilateral amygdala damage in humans, which although producing 
demonstrable deficits in face processing (Adolphs, et al., 2005; Spezio, Huang, Castelli, & Adolphs, 2007), 
decision-making with linked autonomic deficits (Bechara, Damasio, Damasio, & Lee, 1999; Brand, 
Grabenhorst, Starcke, Vandekerckhove, & Markowitsch, 2007), and autonomic conditioning (Phelps & 
LeDoux, 2005), may not produce major changes in emotion that are readily apparent in everyday behaviour 
(Phelps & LeDoux, 2005; Rolls, 2016a; Seymour & Dolan, 2008). A comparison of the roles of the 
amygdala and orbitofrontal cortex in emotion is provided elsewhere (Rolls, 2014a).   
It is also becoming possible to relate the functions of the orbitofrontal cortex to some psychiatric 
symptoms that may reflect changes in behavioural responses to reinforcers, which may be different in 
different individuals. We compared the symptoms of patients with a personality disorder syndrome, 
Borderline Personality Disorder (BPD), with those of patients with lesions of the orbitofrontal cortex (Berlin 
& Rolls, 2004; Berlin, et al., 2005; Berlin, et al., 2004). The symptoms of the self-harming Borderline 
Personality Disorder patients include high impulsivity, affective instability, and emotionality; and low 
extroversion. It was found that orbitofrontal cortex and Borderline Personality Disorder patients performed 
similarly in that they were more impulsive, reported more inappropriate behaviours in the Frontal Behaviour 
Questionnaire, and had more Borderline Personality Disorder characteristics, and anger, and less happiness, 
than control groups (either normals, or patients with lesions outside the orbitofrontal cortex). 
Both the orbitofrontal and BPD groups also had a faster perception of time (i.e. they underproduced 
time) than normal controls (Berlin & Rolls, 2004; Berlin, et al., 2005; Berlin, et al., 2004). This may be one 
factor underlying their increased impulsiveness, in that they feel that sufficient time has elapsed to initiate 
action. This interesting hypothesis and finding deserve further exploration. It was of interest that the BPD 
group, as well as the orbitofrontal group, scored highly on a Frontal Behaviour Questionnaire which assessed 
inappropriate behaviours typical of orbitofrontal cortex patients including disinhibition, social 
inappropriateness, perseveration, and uncooperativeness. Both groups were also less open to experience (i.e. 
less open-minded), a personality characteristic. On the other hand, other aspects of Borderline Personality 
Disorder do not appear to be related to orbitofrontal cortex functions, including the more neurotic and more 
emotional personality characteristics of the BPD patients together with their lower extroversion and 
conscientious (Berlin & Rolls, 2004; Berlin, et al., 2005; Berlin, et al., 2004). 
 Another case in which it is possible to relate psychiatric types of symptom to the functions of the 
orbitofrontal cortex in processing reinforcers is frontotemporal dementia, which is a progressive 
neurodegenerative disorder attacking the frontal lobes and producing major and pervasive behavioural 
changes in personality and social conduct some of which resemble those produced by orbitofrontal lesions 
(Rahman, Sahakian, Hodges, Rogers, & Robbins, 1999; Viskontas, Possin, & Miller, 2007). Patients appear 
either socially disinhibited with facetiousness and inappropriate jocularity, or apathetic and withdrawn. The 
dementia is accompanied by gradual withdrawal from all social interactions. These behaviours could reflect 
impaired processing of reinforcers. (In addition, many patients show mental rigidity and inability to 
appreciate irony or other subtle aspects of language. They tend to engage in ritualistic and stereotypical 
behaviour, and their planning skills are invariably impaired. Memory is usually intact but patients have 
difficulties with working memory and concentration.) Interestingly, given the anatomy and physiology of the 
orbitofrontal cortex, frontotemporal dementia causes profound changes in eating habits, with escalating 
desire for sweet food coupled with reduced satiety, which is often followed by enormous weight gain.  
 The negative symptoms of schizophrenia include flattening of affect. As part of a dynamical attractor 
systems theory of schizophrenia in which hypofunction of NMDA receptors (Coyle, Tsai, & Goff, 2003) 
contributes to the cognitive symptoms such as attentional, working memory, and dysexecutive impairments 
by reducing the depth of the basins of attraction of the prefrontal cortex networks involved in these 
functions, it has been proposed that the flattening of affect is produced by the same reduced NMDA receptor 
function, which decreases the neuronal firing rates, and in the orbitofrontal cortex and related areas would 
lead to decreased affect (Loh, Rolls, & Deco, 2007; Rolls, 2014a, 2016a; Rolls, Loh, Deco, & Winterer, 
2008d). 
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Conversely, it has been proposed that hyperfunctionality of the glutamate system in obsessive 
compulsive disorder (Chakrabarty, Bhattacharyya, Christopher, & Khanna, 2005; Pittenger, Krystal, & 
Coric, 2006) would contribute to overstability in prefrontal and related networks that would contribute to the 
perseverative / obsessional symptoms, and that the concomitant increased firing rates of neurons in the 
orbitofrontal cortex and related areas contributes to the increased emotionality that may be present in 
obsessive-compulsive disorder (Rolls, Loh, & Deco, 2008c).    
 
13. Individual differences in emotion, and the orbitofrontal cortex 
 Given that there are individual differences in emotion, can these individual differences be related to 
the functioning of brain systems involved in affective behaviour such as the orbitofrontal and pregenual 
cingulate cortex? 
Some individuals, chocolate cravers, report that they crave chocolate more than non-cravers, and this 
is associated with increased liking of chocolate, increased wanting of chocolate, and eating chocolate more 
frequently than non-cravers (Rodriguez, et al., 2007). In a test of whether these individual differences are 
reflected in the affective systems in the orbitofrontal cortex and pregenual cingulate cortex that are the 
subject of this paper, Rolls and McCabe (2007) used fMRI to measure the response to the flavor of 
chocolate, to the sight of chocolate, and to their combination, in chocolate cravers vs non-cravers. SPM 
analyses showed that the sight of chocolate produced more activation in chocolate cravers than non-cravers 
in the medial orbitofrontal cortex and ventral striatum. For cravers vs non-cravers, a combination of a picture 
of chocolate with chocolate in the mouth produced a greater effect than the sum of the components (i.e. 
supralinearity) in the medial orbitofrontal cortex and pregenual cingulate cortex. Furthermore, the 
pleasantness ratings of the chocolate and chocolate-related stimuli had higher positive correlations with the 
fMRI BOLD signals in the pregenual cingulate cortex and medial orbitofrontal cortex in the cravers than in 
the non-cravers. Thus there were differences between cravers and non-cravers in their responses to the 
sensory components of a craved food in the orbitofrontal cortex, pregenual cingulate cortex, and ventral 
striatum, and in some of these regions the differences are related to the subjective pleasantness of the craved 
foods. An implication is that individual differences in brain responses to very pleasant foods help to 
understand the mechanisms that drive the liking for specific foods by indicating that some brain systems (but 
not others such as the insular taste cortex) respond more to the rewarding aspects of some foods, and thus 
influence and indeed even predict the intake of those foods (which was much higher in chocolate cravers 
than non-cravers) (Rolls, 2016d; Rolls & McCabe, 2007). 
 Investigating another difference between individuals, Beaver et al (2006) showed that reward 
sensitivity in different individuals (as measured by a behavioural activation scale) is correlated with 
activations in the orbitofrontal cortex and ventral striatum to pictures of appetizing vs disgusting food. 
 When cognitive labels (such as “Rich delicious flavour”) modulate humans’ ratings of the 
pleasantness of flavor, it is possible that some individuals are more affected by this suggestion than others. 
We investigated this in relation to the study by Grabenhorst et al (2008a) on cognitive effects on flavor by 
measuring the suggestibility of the subjects using parts of the SHSS (Stanford Hypnotic) Suggestibility Scale 
(Weitzenhoffer & Hilgard, 1962). It was found that one of the most reliable measures in this scale, the 
moving hands apart test in which subjects are told that there is a force pushing the hands apart, was 
correlated with the magnitude of the effect of the cognitive label “Rich delicious flavour” on the pleasantness 
rating of a standard flavor (r=0.71, df=9, p=0.023) in the subjects used in this study. An implication is that an 
underlying personality variable related to suggestibility is also related to cognitive effects on affective ratings 
(and thus emotion), with the brain region showing a large modulation of its BOLD response by the cognitive 
labels to these stimuli being the medial orbitofrontal cortex and pregenual cingulate cortex (Grabenhorst, et 
al., 2008a). 
 
14. Beyond the orbitofrontal cortex to choice decision-making 
 In the neurophysiological studies described above, we have found that neuronal activity is related to 
the reward value of sensory stimuli, and how these change when reward contingencies change, but is not 
related to the details of actions that are being performed, such as mouth or arm movements (Rolls, 2014a, 
2016a). Wallis (2007) and Padoa-Schioppa and Assad (2006) have obtained evidence that supports this. An 
implication is that the orbitofrontal cortex represents the reward, affective (or, operationally, goal) value of a 
stimulus. Further, this value representation is on a continuous scale, as shown by the gradual decrease in 
orbitofrontal cortex neuronal responses to taste, olfactory and visual rewarding stimuli during feeding to 
satiety (Critchley & Rolls, 1996a; Rolls, et al., 1996a; Rolls, et al., 1999a; Rolls, et al., 1989). Consistently, 
in humans the BOLD activations in different parts of the orbitofrontal cortex are continuously, indeed 
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typically linearly, related to subjective pleasantness ratings of taste (de Araujo, et al., 2003b; Grabenhorst & 
Rolls, 2008; Grabenhorst, et al., 2008a), olfactory (Grabenhorst, et al., 2007), flavor (Grabenhorst, et al., 
2008a; Kringelbach, et al., 2003; McCabe & Rolls, 2007; Plassmann, O'Doherty, Shiv, & Rangel, 2008), oral 
temperature (Guest, et al., 2007), hand temperature (Rolls, et al., 2008b), and face beauty (O'Doherty, et al., 
2003) stimuli, and to monetary reward value (O'Doherty, et al., 2001a), as shown by correlation analyses. An 
implication of these findings is that the orbitofrontal cortex may contribute to decision-making by 
representing on a continuous scale the value of each reward, with, as shown by the single neuron 
neurophysiology, different subsets of neurons for each different particular reward. It is of course essential to 
represent each reward separately, in order to make decisions about and between rewards, and separate 
representations (using distributed encoding (Rolls, 2016a; Rolls & Treves, 2011)) of different rewards are 
present in the orbitofrontal cortex. 
 Approaches used in neuroeconomics help to define further the nature of the representation of 
reinforcers in the orbitofrontal cortex. When monkeys choose between different numbers of drops of two 
juices, one more preferred than the other, some neurons in the orbitofrontal cortex encode the offer value, 
some the choice value, and some the taste, but not the details of the motor response that is chosen (Padoa-
Schioppa, 2011; Padoa-Schioppa & Assad, 2006; Padoa-Schioppa & Cai, 2011). Further, these neurons 
encode economic value, not relative preference, as shown by a study in which a particular reward was paired 
with other rewards. The fact that the neuronal responses are menu invariant suggests that transitivity, a 
fundamental trait of economic choice, may be rooted in the activity of individual neurons (Padoa-Schioppa 
& Assad, 2008). There is also evidence that relative reward value may be represented in the orbitofrontal 
cortex (Tremblay & Schultz, 1999), and in a resolution of this, we have found that some parts of the 
orbitofrontal cortex represent the absolute pleasantness of stimuli and others the relative pleasantness of 
stimuli (Grabenhorst & Rolls, 2009). 
 When a choice is made between stimuli with different reward values, the choice made depends on 
the probability with which each reward will be obtained. In this probabilistic decision-making situation, we 
can define expected value as probability × reward magnitude) (Glimcher, 2004). In an investigation of such a 
probabilistic choice decision task in which humans chose between two rewards each available with different 
probabilities, it was found that the activation of the orbitofrontal cortex was related to expected value while 
the decision was being made, and also to the reward magnitude announced later on each trial (Rolls, et al., 
2008e). Further evidence in a variety of tasks implicates a related and partly overlapping region of the 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex with expected value (Daw, O'Doherty, Dayan, Seymour, & Dolan, 2006; 
Hare, et al., 2008; Kim, Shimojo, & O'Doherty, 2006; Tanaka, et al., 2004). In contrast, the reward 
prediction errors or temporal difference errors as defined in reinforcement learning (Schultz, 2006; Sutton & 
Barto, 1998) are usually evident in the ventral striatum in imaging studies (Hare, et al., 2008; Rolls, et al., 
2008e), though we should remember that negative reward prediction errors are represented by the error 
neurons in the primate orbitofrontal cortex (Thorpe, et al., 1983), and that the lateral orbitofrontal cortex is 
activated when a negative reward prediction error is generated in the reversal of a visual discrimination task 
(Kringelbach & Rolls, 2003).    
 Although it might be anticipated that the actual utility or ‘subjective utility’ of an offer (a choice) to 
an individual approximately tracks the expected value, this is not exactly the case, with subjects typically 
undervaluing high rewards, and being over-sensitive to high punishments (Bernoulli, 1738 / 1954; Gintis, 
2000; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Kahneman & Tversky, 1984; Rangel, Camerer, & Montague, 2008; 
Tversky & Kahneman, 1986; von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944). Subjects also typically have a subjective 
utility function that discounts rewards the further in the future they are delayed. Some parts of the 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex have activations that may follow the subjective utility, of for example delayed 
rewards. In a study of this, it was found that activations in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex were correlated 
with the subjective utility of rewards delayed for different times, with the discount curve for each subject 
reconstructed from each subject’s choices (Kable & Glimcher, 2007). Moreover, the activations in the 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex fitted the curves for each participant well, even though there were large 
individual differences in the reward discounting function, with some participants being impulsive and 
placing much more value on rewards available immediately, and other ‘patient’ participants showing very 
little discounting of rewards available a long time in the future. Thus activations in the ventromedial 
prefrontal cortex may continuously track even the subjective utility of available rewards. In further studies, it 
has been shown that counterfactual effects are manifested in the human orbitofrontal cortex during 
expectation of outcomes, such that the anticipated affective impact of outcomes is modulated by the nature of 
the various possible alternative outcomes (Ursu & Carter, 2005); and that activity in the orbitofrontal cortex 
correlated with the degree of regret, measured in a gambling task in which the outcome of the unchosen 
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gamble would have been greater than the outcome that was obtained by the choice made (Coricelli, et al., 
2005).  
 Clearly a representation of reward magnitude, expected reward, and even the subjective utility of a 
reward is an important input to a decision-making process, and the orbitofrontal cortex (with the 
ventromedial prefrontal area), appears to provide this information. When making a decision between two 
rewards, or whether to work for a reward that has an associated cost, it is important that the exact value of 
each reward is represented and enters the decision-making process. However, when a decision is reached, a 
system is needed that can make a binary choice, so that on one trial the decision might be reward 1, and on 
another trial reward 2, so that a particular action can be taken.  For the evaluation, the neural activity needs to 
represent a stimulus in a way that continuously and faithfully represents the affective value of the stimulus, 
and this could be present independently of whether a binary choice decision is being made or not. On the 
other hand, when a binary (choice) decision must be reached, a neural system is needed that does not 
continuously represent the affective value of the stimulus, but which instead falls into a binary state, in which 
for example the high firing of some neurons represents one decision (i.e. choice), and the high firing of other 
neurons represents a different choice. 
 To investigate whether representing the affective value of a reward on a continuous scale may occur 
before and separately from making a binary, for example yes-no, decision about whether to choose the 
reward, Grabenhorst et al (2008b) used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to measure 
activations produced by pleasant warm, unpleasant cold, and affectively complex combinations of these 
stimuli applied to the hand.  On some trials the affective value was rated on a continuous scale, and on 
different trials a Yes-No (binary choice) decision was made about whether the stimulus should be repeated in 
future. Activations that were continuously related to the pleasantness ratings and which were not influenced 
when a binary (choice) decision was made were found in the orbitofrontal and pregenual cingulate cortex, 
implicating these regions in the continuous representation of affective value. The orbitofrontal cortex 
projects to the pregenual cingulate cortex (Carmichael & Price, 1996; Price, 2006), and both these areas have 
reward and punishment value representations that correlate on a continuous scale with the subjective 
pleasantness / unpleasantness ratings of olfactory (Anderson, et al., 2003; Grabenhorst, et al., 2007; Rolls, et 
al., 1996b; Rolls, et al., 2003b), taste (Grabenhorst, et al., 2008a; Rolls, et al., 1989; Small, et al., 2003), 
somatosensory (Rolls, et al., 2003c), temperature (Guest, et al., 2007), visual (O'Doherty, et al., 2003), 
monetary (Knutson, Rick, Wimmer, Prelec, & Loewenstein, 2007; O'Doherty, et al., 2001a), and social 
stimuli (Hornak, et al., 2003; Kringelbach & Rolls, 2003; Moll, et al., 2006; Spitzer, Fischbacher, 
Herrnberger, Gron, & Fehr, 2007) (see further Bush, Luu, & Posner, 2000; Rolls, 2009a, 2014a). In the study 
with warm and cold stimuli, and mixtures of them, decision-making contrasted with just rating the affective 
stimuli revealed activations in the medial prefrontal cortex area 10, implicating this area in choice decision 
making (Grabenhorst, et al., 2008b) (see Fig. 13).  
 Support for a contribution of medial prefrontal cortex area 10 to taking binary (choice) decisions 
comes from a fMRI study in which two odors were separated by a delay, with instructions on different trials 
to decide which odor was more pleasant, or more intense, or to rate the pleasantness and intensity of the 
second odor on a continuous scale without making a binary (choice) decision. Activations in the medial 
prefrontal cortex area 10, and in regions to which it projects including the anterior cingulate cortex and 
insula, were higher when binary choice decisions were being made compared to ratings on a continuous 
scale, further implicating these regions in binary decision-making (Rolls, Grabenhorst, & Parris, 2010d).  
Consistent with a role of medial prefrontal cortex area 10 in decision-making, patients with medial 
prefrontal cortex lesions are impaired in a decision-making shopping task, as reflected for example by visits 
to previously visited locations (Burgess, 2000; Burgess, Gilbert, & Dumontheil, 2007; Shallice & Burgess, 
1991). In another imaging study, area 10 activation has been related to moral decision-making (Heekeren, et 
al., 2005). 
To further explore how choice decision-making is implemented in the brain, we have utilized an 
attractor network model of decision-making with spiking neurons in which the representations of each choice 
are by a subpopulation of neurons, and the attractor network settles into one of its two or more high firing 
rate attractor states each representing a choice (Deco & Rolls, 2006; Deco, Rolls, Albantakis, & Romo, 2013; 
Rolls, 2016a; Rolls & Deco, 2010; Wang, 2002). We showed that the model predicts that the BOLD signal 
become larger with the easiness of the decision (i.e. the difference between the two decision variables) on 
correct trials, and showed that this signature is found anterior to the orbitofrontal cortex, in medial prefrontal 
cortex area 10 (which may overlap with what some other investigators have termed the ventromedial 
prefrontal cortex) during choice of pleasantness for both olfactory and thermal stimuli (warmth to the hand) 
(Rolls, Grabenhorst, & Deco, 2010b). The model also predicts that the BOLD signal become smaller with 
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the easiness of the decision on error trials, and we showed that this signature is also found in medial 
prefrontal cortex area 10 in the same pleasantness choice tasks (Rolls, Grabenhorst, & Deco, 2010c).  
Thus there is considerable evidence that value representation on a continuous scale is provided by 
the orbitofrontal cortex, and that choices between these value representations are made just anterior to this by 
an attractor decision-making network (Rolls, 2014a). Consistent with the evidence and discoveries described 
here for humans, posterior orbitofrontal cortex (area 13) lesions in macaques impair the effects of satiation 
on reward value, whereas anterior orbitofrontal cortex (area 11) lesions impair choice decision-making 
(Murray, Moylan, Saleem, Basile, & Turchi, 2015). 
 
15. The orbitofrontal cortex and depression 
 
15.1. Foundations 
 Major depressive disorder is ranked by the World Health Organization as the leading cause of years-
of-life lived with disability (Drevets, 2007; Gotlib & Hammen, 2009; Hamilton, Chen, & Gotlib, 2013). 
Major depressive episodes, found in both major depressive disorder and bipolar disorder are pathological 
mood states characterized by persistently sad or depressed mood. Major depressive disorders are generally 
accompanied by: (a) altered incentive and reward processing, evidenced by amotivation, apathy, and 
anhedonia; (b) impaired modulation of anxiety and worry, manifested by generalized, social and panic 
anxiety, and oversensitivity to negative feedback; (c) inflexibility of thought and behavior in association with 
changing reinforcement contingencies, apparent as ruminative thoughts of self-reproach, pessimism, and 
guilt, and inertia toward initiating goal-directed behavior; (d) altered integration of sensory and social 
information, as evidenced by mood-congruent processing biases; (e) impaired attention and memory, shown 
as performance deficits on tests of attention set-shifting and maintenance, and autobiographical and short-
term memory; and (f) visceral disturbances, including altered weight, appetite, sleep, and endocrine and 
autonomic function (Drevets, 2007; Gotlib & Hammen, 2009).  
A new theory of how mechanisms in the orbitofrontal cortex are involved in depression has recently 
been developed (Rolls, 2016c). The theory is related to attractor network dynamics, which enable states to be 
maintained by continuing firing within a population of neurons with strong excitatory synaptic inter-
connections (Rolls, 2016a; Rolls & Deco, 2010), and which are evident for non-reward in the lateral 
orbitofrontal cortex, as described next. The theory extends hypotheses of depression to the concept that over-
active attractor networks (Deco, et al., 2013; Rolls, 2016a; Rolls & Deco, 2010) in some brain regions 
related to emotion (Rolls, 2014a) are involved in depression. 
The foundations for the theory include the following. 
First, neurophysiological evidence indicates that neurons in the orbitofrontal cortex respond to non-
reward. The orbitofrontal cortex contains a population of error neurons that respond to non-reward and 
maintain their firing for many seconds after the non-reward, providing evidence that they have entered an 
attractor state that maintains a memory of the non-reward (Fig. 9) (Rolls, 2014b; Thorpe, et al., 1983). 
Attractor networks once triggered can maintain their high firing rate because of the strong recurrent 
excitatory synaptic connections between the neuronal sub-population (Rolls, 2016a) (with Appendix B 
describing attractor networks available at http://www.oxcns.org).  This short-term memory of a recent 
negatively reinforcing event is an essential component of a system that must change its operation after non-
reward in a rule-based way, and this has been modelled (Deco & Rolls, 2005c). 
Second, human functional neuroimaging evidence indicates that the lateral orbitofrontal cortex is 
activated by non-reward, and also by punishers that affect emotion-related behavior similarly (Rolls, 2014a). 
The activation of the human lateral orbitofrontal cortex during reward reversal is illustrated in Fig. 10a, 
which shows activations on reversal trials, that is when the human subject chose one person’s face, and did 
not obtain the expected reward (Kringelbach & Rolls, 2003). Activations in the lateral orbitofrontal cortex 
are also produced by a signal to stop a response that is now incorrect, which is another situation in which 
behavior must change in order to be correct (Fig. 10b) (Deng, et al., 2017). Orbitofrontal cortex activations 
in the stop-signal task have further been related to how impulsive the behavior is (Whelan, et al., 2012). In 
this context, it has been suggested that impulsiveness may reflect how sensitive an individual is to non-
reward or punishment (Rolls, 2014a), and indeed we have shown that people with orbitofrontal cortex 
damage become more impulsive (Berlin, et al., 2005; Berlin, et al., 2004). The lateral orbitofrontal cortex 
also responds to many punishing, unpleasant, stimuli (Grabenhorst & Rolls, 2011; Rolls, 2014b) including 
bad odor (Rolls, et al., 2003b) and losing money (O'Doherty, et al., 2001a), as shown in Fig. 8. The 
computations involved in non-reward referred to below are more complicated than those involved in 
representing punishers, but both types of representation are present in the orbitofrontal cortex, are 
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implemented by different neurons, and both are involved in changing behavior to no longer choose the now 
non-rewarded stimulus, or the punisher (Rolls, 2014a, 2016a; Thorpe, et al., 1983). The lateral orbitofrontal 
cortex projects to the supracallosal anterior cingulate cortex, in which non-rewards and punishers are also 
represented (Grabenhorst & Rolls, 2011; Rolls, 2014a; Rolls & Grabenhorst, 2008) (Figs. 3 and 8) in this 
region implicated in action-outcome learning (Grabenhorst & Rolls, 2011; Noonan, Mars, & Rushworth, 
2011; Rolls, 2014a). The effects of reward reversal on this supracallosal cingulate cortex system are 
illustrated in Fig. 10a (green circle). 
Consistent with this evidence for humans, functional neuroimaging in macaques reveals that the 
macaque lateral orbitofrontal cortex is activated by non-reward during a reversal task (Chau, et al., 2015) 
(Fig. 10c). Investigations into the effects of lesions in macaques have not yet fully investigated the 
differences between the medial orbitofrontal cortex areas (including 13 posteriorly and 11 anteriorly) and the 
lateral orbitofrontal cortex (area 12) (Rudebeck & Murray, 2014). The discoveries described in this paper 
indicate that in humans, there are at least three main divisions. The medial orbitofrontal cortex areas (13 and 
11) are involved in reward value representations with subjective pleasantness linearly related to the activity 
and with devaluation by satiety reducing the response (Rolls, 2014b). The lateral orbitofrontal cortex areas 
(12/47 extending round the inferior convexity towards the ventral part of the inferior frontal gyrus to perhaps 
include a ventral part of right area 45) is involved in detecting and representing non-reward as a difference 
between the expected value and the outcome value (i.e. negative reward prediction error)  and punishment, 
both of which can be used to change instrumental actions, and which relate to the older literature which used 
the less specific term behavioural inhibition (Rolls, 2014b). The more anterior parts of the orbitofrontal 
cortex, including part of what may be medial area 10 and parts of anterior 11), are involved in choice 
decision-making between stimuli with different value (Grabenhorst & Rolls, 2011; Grabenhorst, et al., 
2008b; Rolls, 2014b; Rolls & Grabenhorst, 2008; Rolls, et al., 2010b, 2010c; Rolls, et al., 2010d).  
Third, lesion evidence also shows that the orbitofrontal cortex is involved in changing rewarded 
behavior when non-reward is detected, in that damage to the human orbitofrontal cortex impairs reward 
reversal learning, with the previously rewarded stimulus still being chosen during reversal even when no 
reward is being obtained (Fellows, 2011; Fellows & Farah, 2003; Hornak, et al., 2004; Rolls, et al., 1994a). 
There is consistent evidence in macaques (Rolls, 2016a) with orbitofrontal cortex damage impairing 
performance on Go/NoGo task performance, in that they Go on the NoGo trials (Iversen & Mishkin, 1970), 
and in an object-reversal task in that they respond to the object that was formerly rewarded with food, and in 
extinction in that they continue to respond to an object that is no longer rewarded (Butter, 1969; Jones & 
Mishkin, 1972; Meunier, Bachevalier, & Mishkin, 1997). The visual discrimination reversal learning deficit 
shown by monkeys with orbitofrontal cortex damage (Murray & Izquierdo, 2007) may be due at least in part 
to the tendency of these monkeys not to withhold choosing non-rewarded stimuli (Jones & Mishkin, 1972) 
including objects that were previously rewarded during reversal (Rudebeck & Murray, 2011), and including 
foods that are not normally accepted (Baylis & Gaffan, 1991; Butter, et al., 1969). Consistently, orbitofrontal 
cortex (but not amygdala) lesions impaired instrumental extinction (Murray & Izquierdo, 2007). 
In an evolutionary context, this very rapid, rule-based, reversal of stimulus-reward associations 
possible in primates including humans may be an important adaptation to allow rapid and flexible changes of 
behaviour when reinforcement contingencies change, and is likely to be very important in social interaction 
(Rolls, 2014a, 2016a). The detection of this non-reward may be computed in the orbitofrontal cortex using 
reciprocally inhibiting Reward and Non-Reward attractor neuronal populations in a single network (Rolls & 
Deco, 2016).  
  
15.2. A non-reward attractor theory of depression 
 It is well established that not receiving expected reward, or receiving unpleasant stimuli or events, 
can produce depression (Beck, 2008; Drevets, 2007; Eshel & Roiser, 2010; Harmer & Cowen, 2013; Price & 
Drevets, 2012; Pryce, et al., 2011). More formally, in terms of learning theory, the omission or termination 
of a reward can give rise to sadness or depression, depending on the magnitude of the reward that is lost, if 
there is no action that can be taken to restore the reward (Rolls, 2013b, 2014a). If an action can be taken, 
then frustration and anger may arise for the same reinforcement contingency (Rolls, 2014a). This relates the 
current approach to the learned helplessness approach to depression, in which depression arises because no 
actions are being taken to restore rewards (Forgeard, et al., 2011; Pryce, et al., 2011). The sadness or 
depression may be short lasting if it is a minor non-reward. The depression may be longer lasting if for 
example a member of the family dies, for every time that we remember the person we are aware of the loss 
of the reward of being with them, and this contributes to the longer-term depression that may arise. 
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 On the basis of the evidence just described on the brain mechanisms involved in non-reward, and the 
non-reward triggers for depression, the theory has been proposed that in depression, the lateral orbitofrontal 
cortex non-reward / punishment attractor network system is more easily triggered and/or is very strongly 
triggered, and is therefore activated more often and maintains its attractor-related firing for longer (Rolls, 
2016c). The greater attractor-related firing of the orbitofrontal cortex non-reward / punishment system then 
triggers negative cognitive states held on-line in other cortical systems, such as the dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex which is implicated in attentional control, and language areas, which in turn have top-down effects on 
the orbitofrontal non-reward system that help to bias it in a negative direction and thus to increase its 
sensitivity to non-reward and maintain its overactivity (Rolls, 2013a, 2016a).  It is proposed that the 
interaction of two different brain systems of this type contributes to the long-lasting ruminating and 
continuing depressive thoughts which occur as a result of a positive feedback attractor cycle between these 
types of brain system. This can be described as a long-loop attractor system, involving reciprocal interactions 
between cortical areas (Rolls, 2016c) (Fig. 14).  
 Indeed, we have shown that cognitive states can have top-down effects on affective representations 
in the orbitofrontal cortex (de Araujo, et al., 2005; Grabenhorst, et al., 2008a; McCabe, et al., 2008; Rolls, 
2013a). Further, top-down selective attention can also influence affective representations in the orbitofrontal 
cortex (Ge, Feng, Grabenhorst, & Rolls, 2012; Grabenhorst & Rolls, 2008; Grabenhorst & Rolls, 2010; Luo, 
Ge, Grabenhorst, Feng, & Rolls, 2013; Rolls, 2013a; Rolls, et al., 2008a), and paying attention to depressive 
symptoms when depressed may in this way exacerbate the problems in a positive feedback way. (Top-down 
attention refers to the process whereby an area such as the prefrontal cortex can hold in short-term memory 
what it is that attention should enhance, and can then bias ‘lower’ brain areas to respond more to some 
properties of what they respond to (Deco & Rolls, 2005b; Desimone & Duncan, 1995; Rolls, 2013a, 2016a; 
Rolls & Deco, 2002).) 
 More generally, the presence of the cognitive ability to think ahead and see the implications of recent 
events that is afforded by language may be a computational and evolutionary development in the brain that 
exacerbates the vulnerability of the human brain to depression (Rolls, 2014a). The circuitry that may 
implement this is illustrated in Fig. 14. Further, whenever a memory is retrieved from the hippocampal and 
related systems the emotional component reactivates the orbitofrontal cortex emotional system (Rolls, 
2015b), contributing to the long-lasting nature of depression. 
 The theory is that one way in which depression could result from over-activity in this lateral 
orbitofrontal cortex non-reward system is if there is a major negatively reinforcing life event that produces 
reactive depression and activates this system, which then becomes self-re-exciting based on the cycle 
between the lateral orbitofrontal cortex non-reward / punishment attractor system and the cognitive system, 
which together operate as a systems-level attractor (Fig. 14). The theory is that a second way in which 
depression might arise is if this lateral orbitofrontal cortex non-reward / punishment system is especially 
sensitive in some individuals. This might be related for example to genetic predisposition; or to the effects of 
chronic stress which influences cortical regions including the orbitofrontal cortex (Gold, 2015; Radley, 
Morilak, Viau, & Campeau, 2015). In this case, the orbitofrontal system would over-react to normal levels of 
non-reward or punishment, or even become active in the absence of a stimulus, and start the local attractor 
circuit in the lateral orbitofrontal cortex, which in turn would activate the cognitive system, which would 
feed back to the over-reactive lateral orbitofrontal cortex system to maintain now a systems-level attractor 
with ruminating thoughts (Fig. 14). In the theory, an oversensitive or over-responding short-term non-reward 
system in the lateral orbitofrontal cortex can produce long-lasting depression (a) because it activates the 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and related cognitive including language systems that continue thinking about 
the non-reward and re-excite the orbitofrontal cortex by top-down influences (see illustration in Fig. 14); and 
(b) because the orbitofrontal cortex non-reward system is activated whenever the human memory system 
retrieves a memory associated with a sad event (Rolls, 2015b), re-activating the positive feedback system 
between the orbitofrontal and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. In that the lateral orbitofrontal cortex connects 
to the supracallosal part of the anterior cingulate cortex, this is also expected to be over-active or to have 
increased functional connectivity in depression. 
 A complementary part of the theory is that the medial orbitofrontal cortex reward-related areas are 
underactive in depression (Rolls, 2016c). There is evidence for reciprocal interactions between the lateral 
and medial orbitofrontal cortex. For example, monetary loss activates the lateral orbitofrontal cortex and 
deactivates the medial orbitofrontal cortex; and monetary gain activates the medial orbitofrontal cortex and 
deactivates the lateral orbitofrontal cortex (O'Doherty, et al., 2001a). This relationship is supported by 
evidence from resting-state functional connectivity (Rolls, et al., 2017a), as follows. All the medial 
orbitofrontal cortex areas in the automated anatomical labelling atlas specially revised for the orbitofrontal 
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cortex (Rolls, Joliot, & Tzourio-Mazoyer, 2015) (OFCmed, OFCant, OFCpost, Rectus, and OLF) had a high 
functional connectivity (correlation) with each other that is on average 0.58 (std 0.13) (in the control group). 
Similarly, the two lateral orbitofrontal cortex areas (OFClat and IFG_Orb) have high functional connectivity 
with each other that is on average 0.68 (std 0.08). However, the mean FC between the medial orbitofrontal 
cortex areas and lateral orbitofrontal cortex areas was much lower, 0.36 (std 0.16), and the difference was 
significant (t test, p<10-12). Further, this relates to an average functional connectivity value across all pairs in 
the brain of 0.35. This evidence provides an indication that the medial and lateral orbitofrontal cortex areas 
are not positively coupled to each other, but can operate in opposite directions, and even could operate 
reciprocally (Rolls, et al., 2017a). The putative reciprocity between the lateral (non-reward-related) and 
medial (reward-related) parts of the orbitofrontal cortex is supported by the finding that there is strong 
effective (resting-state) connectivity directed from the medial orbitofrontal cortex to the lateral orbitofrontal 
cortex, and that this is increased in depression  (Rolls, et al., 2017a). The low value for functional 
connectivity (between these two areas) indicates that this is likely to reflect a reciprocal relationship between 
the medial and lateral orbitofrontal cortex. The anhedonia of depression is very likely to reflect decreased 
activity in the medial orbitofrontal cortex. 
 
15.3. Evidence consistent with the theory 
 There is some evidence for altered structure and function of the lateral orbitofrontal cortex in 
depression (Drevets, 2007; Ma, 2015; Price & Drevets, 2012). For example, reductions of grey-matter 
volume and cortex thickness have been demonstrated specifically in the posterolateral orbitofrontal cortex / 
ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (BA 47, caudal BA 11 and the adjoining BA 45), and also in the subgenual 
cingulate cortex (BA 24, 25) (Drevets, 2007; Nugent, et al., 2006). In depression, there is increased cerebral 
blood flow in areas that include the ventrolateral orbitofrontal cortex (which is a prediction of the theory), 
and also in regions such as the subgenual cingulate cortex and amygdala, and these increases appear to be 
related to the mood change, in that they become more normal when the mood state remits (Drevets, 2007). 
 Because the lateral orbitofrontal cortex responds to many punishing and non-rewarding stimuli 
(Grabenhorst & Rolls, 2011; Rolls, 2014a, 2014b) that are likely to elicit autonomic/visceral responses, as 
does the supracallosal anterior cingulate cortex, and in view of connections from these areas to the anterior 
insula which is implicated in autonomic/visceral function (Critchley & Harrison, 2013; Rolls, 2016b), the 
anterior insula would also be expected to be overactive in depression, and that prediction is confirmed 
(Drevets, 2007; Hamilton, et al., 2013; Ma, 2015).  
 Evidence from the first brain-wide voxel-level resting state functional-connectivity neuroimaging 
analysis of depression with 421 patients with major depressive disorder and 488 controls (Cheng, Rolls et al 
(2016)) provides support for and helps to refine the theory of depression. Resting state functional 
connectivity between different voxels reflects correlations of activity between those voxels and is a 
fundamental tool in helping to understand the brain regions with altered connectivity and function in 
depression. 
 One major circuit with altered functional connectivity involved the medial orbitofrontal cortex BA 
13, which is implicated in reward, and which had reduced functional connectivity in depression with memory 
systems in the parahippocampal gyrus and medial temporal lobe (Fig. 15). The lateral orbitofrontal cortex 
BA 47/12, involved in non-reward and punishing events, did not have this reduced functional connectivity 
with memory systems, so that there is an imbalance in depression towards decreased reward-related memory 
system functionality. The reduced functional connectivity of the medial orbitofrontal cortex, implicated in 
reward, with memory systems (relative to the lateral orbitofrontal cortex) provides a new way of 
understanding how memory systems may be biased away from pleasant events in depression (Cheng, et al., 
2016). Consistent with this two other areas connected to the orbitofrontal cortex and involved in emotion, the 
amygdala and anterior cingulate cortex have reduced functional connectivity with the orbitofrontal cortex 
and with temporal lobe memory systems in depression (Cheng, et al., 2017; Rolls, et al., 2017b). 
 Second, the lateral orbitofrontal cortex BA 47/12 had increased functional connectivity with the 
precuneus, the angular gyrus, and the temporal visual cortex BA 21 (Fig. 15). This enhanced functional 
connectivity of the non-reward/punishment system (BA 47/12) with the precuneus (involved in the sense of 
self and agency), and the angular gyrus (involved in language) may it is suggested be related to the explicit 
affectively negative sense of the self, and of self-esteem, in depression. The increased functional connectivity 
of the lateral orbitofrontal cortex, implicated in non-reward and punishment, with areas of the brain 
implicated in representing the self, language, and inputs from face and related perceptual systems (Fig. 15) 
(Cheng, et al., 2016) provides a new way of understanding how unpleasant events and thoughts, and lowered 
self-esteem, may be exacerbated in depression. The increased connectivity between the lateral orbitofrontal 
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cortex and the angular gyrus system involved in language (Fig. 15) directly supports the hypothesis 
illustrated in Fig. 14. It is of considerable interest that this lateral orbitofrontal cortex region is primarily on 
the right of the brain, and extends round the inferior frontal convexity to the ventral parts of the inferior 
frontal gyrus pars triangularis (BA45), anteriorly (and to some extent pars opercularis (BA44) posteriorly), 
both of which share the same type of functional connectivity differences in depression as the lateral 
orbitofrontal cortex. These areas have increased functional connectivity with the temporal cortex, precuneus, 
and angular (BA39) and supramarginal gyri (BA40) bilaterally (Cheng, et al., 2016).  The region is 
sometimes known as the inferior frontal gyrus, pars orbitalis. In the left hemisphere BA45 and BA44 are 
Broca’s area (Amunts & Zilles, 2012; Clos, Amunts, Laird, Fox, & Eickhoff, 2013), but in the right 
hemisphere the ventral parts of these areas may serve as a route for the lateral orbitofrontal cortex to connect 
with motor-related cortical areas. It is notable that this same right lateral orbitofrontal cortex area is activated 
in the stop-signal task (Deng, et al., 2017), consistent with the hypothesis that this area is involved in 
detecting non-reward, punishers, and other signals that need to reverse reward-based and related processing 
to change behaviour (Rolls, 2016c). The extension of this lateral orbitofrontal cortex area BA47/12 round the 
inferior frontal convexity to the ventral parts of the inferior frontal gyrus BA45 and BA44 is consistent with 
resting-state functional connectivity parcellation studies (Goulas, et al., 2017; Samara, et al., 2017). 
Moreover and consistently, this same lateral orbitofrontal cortex region has functional connectivity that is 
negatively related to happiness / subjective well-being (Liu, Ma, Rolls, & Feng, 2017). Further, as a follow-
up to my lateral orbitofrontal cortex non-reward attractor theory of depression (Rolls, 2016c), it is now being 
shown that inhibitory rTMS (repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation) of the right lateral orbitofrontal 
cortex can relieve depression in at least some patients (Fettes, Giacobbe, Blumberger, & Downar, 2017a; 
Fettes, Peters, Giacobbe, Blumberger, & Downar, 2017b). Interestingly, the subcallosal cingulate cortex, 
implicated in depression (Hamani, et al., 2011; Laxton, et al., 2013), has increased functional connectivity 
with the lateral orbitofrontal cortex in depression (Rolls, et al., 2017b). 
 Some of these differences in functional connectivity in depression were related to the depression in 
that there were significant correlations between some of the different functional links in depression and the 
symptom severity scores and illness duration (Cheng, et al., 2016). One finding was that the Hamilton and 
Beck depression scores were correlated with some of the weakened functional connectivities of the medial 
orbitofrontal cortex. Another finding was that medication reduced the increased functional connectivity of 
some lateral orbitofrontal cortex links in depression. These findings provide further evidence that the 
orbitofrontal cortex functioning is related to depression (Cheng, et al., 2016). 
 To provide evidence of some of the possible causal routes by which brain connectivity is altered in 
depression, the first brain-wide resting state effective-connectivity neuroimaging analysis of depression, with 
353 healthy individuals, and 347 patients with major depressive disorder (Rolls, et al., 2017a) has used a new 
algorithm for going beyond functional connectivity (which reflects correlations) to effective connectivity, 
which measures how one brain area influences another brain area (Gilson, Moreno-Bote, Ponce-Alvarez, 
Ritter, & Deco, 2016). Key discoveries were as follows. The medial cortex has reduced effective 
connectivity from temporal lobe input areas in depression. This could account for lower activity in the 
medial orbitofrontal cortex in depression. In turn, the temporal cortical visual areas receive increased 
effective connectivity from the precuneus, implicated in the sense of self. (Self-esteem is low in depression.) 
The lateral orbitofrontal cortex has increased activity (variance) in depression; and increased effective 
connectivity from the medial orbitofrontal cortex in depression, as described above (Rolls, et al., 2017a). 
This investigation makes a start towards understanding some of the causal circuitry that operates differently 
in depression.  
 Treatments that can reduce depression such as a single dose of ketamine (Iadarola, et al., 2015) may 
act in part by quashing the attractor state in the lateral orbitofrontal cortex / ventrolateral prefrontal cortex at 
least temporarily (though there is also evidence that ketamine’s effect on depression may be related to 
blocking by blocking NR2B glutamatergic synapses onto GABA neurons). Evidence consistent with the 
possibility that ketamine depresses activity in the lateral orbitofrontal cortex is that glucose metabolism in 
the ventrolateral prefrontal cortex is decreased by a single dose of ketamine that ameliorates depression 
(Carlson, et al., 2013), and in the lateral orbitofrontal cortex the decrease is related to the increase in hedonia 
produced by the ketamine (Lally, et al., 2015). This NMDA receptor blocker may act at least in part by 
decreasing the high firing rate state of attractor networks by reducing transmission in the recurrent collateral 
excitatory connections between the neurons (Deco, et al., 2013; Rolls, 2012a; Rolls & Deco, 2010, 2015; 
Rolls, et al., 2008d). Another NMDA receptor blocker, nitrous oxide, has also been shown to have an 
antidepressant effect, though the therapeutic use of nitrous oxide is not recommended because it produces 
vitamin B12 depletion (Nagele, et al., 2015). Electroconvulsive therapy (ECT), which may have 
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antidepressant effects, may also knock the non-reward system out of its attractor state, and this may 
contribute to any antidepressant effect. It has been shown that successful ECT for major depressive disorder 
is associated with reduced activation of the orbitofrontal cortex in emotional tasks (Beall, et al., 2012). 
 Electrical stimulation of the brain that may relieve depression (Hamani, et al., 2009; Hamani, et al., 
2011; Lujan, et al., 2013) may act in part by providing reward that reciprocally inhibits the non-reward 
system, and/or by knocking the lateral orbitofrontal cortex and connected systems out of their attractor state. 
Treatment with antidepressant drugs decreases the activity of this lateral orbitofrontal cortex system (Ma, 
2015). 
 Antidepressant drugs such as Selective Serotonin Reuptake Inhibitors (SSRIs) may treat depression 
by producing positive biases in the processing of emotional stimuli (Harmer & Cowen, 2013), increasing 
brain responses to positive stimuli and decreasing responses to negative stimuli (Ma, 2015). These drugs may 
act on brainstem systems influenced by the orbitofrontal cortex via the habenula (Rolls, 2017c). The reward 
and non-reward systems are likely to operate reciprocally, so that facilitating the reward system, or providing 
rewards, and thus activating the medial orbitofrontal cortex (Grabenhorst & Rolls, 2011; Rolls, 2014a), may 
operate in part by inhibiting the overactivity in the lateral orbitofrontal cortex non-reward / punishment 
system. Reciprocal activations of the medial orbitofrontal cortex reward systems and lateral orbitofrontal 
cortex non-reward systems are evident in a monetary reward/loss task (O'Doherty, et al., 2001a). The 
generally decreased functional connectivity of the medial orbitofrontal cortex in depression and the increased 
functional connectivity of the lateral orbitofrontal cortex illustrated in Fig. 15 (Cheng, et al., 2016) also 
provides support for the theory that these systems operate in different directions in depression. 
 
15.4 Implications of the orbitofrontal cortex non-reward attractor theory of depression 
The implications can be understood and further explored in the context of investigations of the 
factors that influence the stability of attractor neuronal networks with integrate-and-fire neurons with noise 
introduced by the close to Poisson spiking times of the neurons (Deco, et al., 2013; Deco, Rolls, & Romo, 
2009; Loh, et al., 2007; Rolls, 2016a; Rolls & Deco, 2010, 2011, 2015; Rolls, et al., 2010c; Rolls, et al., 
2008c; Rolls, et al., 2008d; Wang, 2002). One is that interventions such as deep brain stimulation, rTMS, or 
transcranial direct current inactivation (tDCS) of the lateral orbitofrontal cortex may be useful to explore 
further for the treatment of depression. A second is that it might be possible to produce agents that decrease 
the efficacy of NMDA (or other excitatory) receptors in the lateral orbitofrontal cortex, or increase the 
efficacy of GABA transmission, thereby reducing the stability of the depression-related attractor state. A 
third is that antianxiety drugs, by increasing inhibition, might reduce the stability of the high firing rate state 
of the non-reward attractor, thus acting to quash the depression-related attractor state. A fourth is that the 
whole concept of attractor states has many implications for the treatment of depression, for rewards and other 
environmental changes and activities that tend to compete with the non-reward attractor state and quash it 
may be useful in the treatment of depression (Rolls, 2016c). These cognitive approaches might include 
diverting thought and attention away from the negative stimuli and influences that may contribute to the 
depression; and directing thought and attention towards rewards, which may help to quash the activity of the 
non-reward system by the reciprocal interactions.  
 
15.5 Relation of the orbitofrontal cortex to the anterior cingulate cortex in depression 
There is considerable evidence that the anterior cingulate cortex is involved in emotion, with a 
pregenual part activated by many rewards, and a supracallosal part activated by non-reward and punishers 
(Grabenhorst & Rolls, 2011; Rolls, 2009a, 2014a; Vogt, 2009). The subcallosal anterior cingulate cortex 
(with a smaller region referred to previously as subgenual cingulate cortex) has been implicated in 
depression, and stimulation in the subcallosal cingulate cortex has been used to treat depression (Drevets, 
Gadde, & Krishnan, 2004; Drevets, et al., 1997; Drysdale, et al., 2017; Dunlop, et al., 2017; Hamani, et al., 
2009; Hamani, et al., 2011; Johansen-Berg, et al., 2008; Kang, Bowman, Mayberg, & Liu, 2016; Laxton, et 
al., 2013; Lujan, et al., 2013; Mayberg, 2003; Mayberg, Riva-Posse, & Crowell, 2016; McGrath, et al., 2014; 
McGrath, et al., 2013; McInerney, et al., 2017; Price & Drevets, 2010, 2012; Ramirez-Mahaluf, Roxin, 
Mayberg, & Compte, 2017; Riva-Posse, et al., 2017). What then is the relation between the roles of the 
orbitofrontal cortex and the anterior cingulate cortex, in depression, and in the context that the orbitofrontal 
cortex has major projections to the anterior cingulate cortex? 
In a voxel-level functional connectivity study in 336 patients with major depressive disorder and 350 
controls, parcellation of the anterior cingulate cortex in the controls based on its functional connectivity with 
voxels in other brain regions, followed by tests of how this connectivity was different in depression, showed 
the following (Rolls, et al., 2017b). A supracallosal anterior cingulate cluster had relatively reduced 
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functional connectivity in depression with the right lateral orbitofrontal cortex. This is interesting, for both 
areas are activated by non-reward and punishers (Grabenhorst & Rolls, 2011; Rolls, 2014a).  
A pregenual cingulate cortex cluster had especially relatively weak functional connectivity with the 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC) in patients with depression; and also with temporal lobe areas 
including the parahippocampal gyrus and hippocampus, the angular and supramarginal gyri, the precuneus, 
and middle and superior frontal gyri.  
A subcallosal cingulate cortex cluster 3 had especially strong functional connectivity with voxels in 
the right lateral orbitofrontal cortex (IFGorb) and its two nearby areas, the right inferior frontal gyrus pars 
triangularis (BA45) and pars opercularis (BA44) in patients with depression. 
This casts a new light on the functions of the anterior cingulate cortex in depression which relates it 
to the orbitofrontal cortex, for it divides the anterior cingulate cortex into these three divisions, each of which 
is related functionally to the medial or lateral orbitofrontal cortex, and each of which has different functional 
connectivity in depression (Rolls, et al., 2017b).  
 
15.6 Summary of the roles of the orbitofrontal cortex in depression 
Increased understanding of the right lateral orbitofrontal cortex is advancing our understanding of 
this as a key region in changing behaviour when reward is no longer being received, or a punisher or signal 
to change behaviour is received (Chau, et al., 2015; Deng, et al., 2017; Grabenhorst & Rolls, 2011; 
Kringelbach & Rolls, 2003; O'Doherty, et al., 2001a; Thorpe, et al., 1983). Much such evidence, and the 
understanding that non-reward can lead to sadness and potentially depression (Rolls, 2014a), led to my 
lateral orbitofrontal cortex non-reward attractor theory of depression (Rolls, 2016c). In relation to this, we 
discovered that in depression the right lateral orbitofrontal cortex, and the ventral part of the right inferior 
frontal gyrus (ventral BA45) have increased functional connectivity with the temporal cortex, precuneus, and 
angular (BA39) and supramarginal gyri (BA40) bilaterally (Cheng, et al., 2016).  As a follow-up to this 
attractor theory of depression it is now being shown that inhibitory rTMS of the right lateral orbitofrontal 
cortex can relieve depression in at least some patients (Fettes, et al., 2017a; Fettes, et al., 2017b). It has also 
been suggested that the orbitofrontal cortex and related brain areas involved in emotion such as the anterior 
cingulate cortex and amygdala (Rolls, 2014a) influence via the ventral striatum and habenula the brainstem 
monoamine systems including serotonin and dopamine via which some current pharmacological treatments 
for depression may act (Rolls, 2017c). This non-reward attractor theory of depression also has many 
complementary implications for cognitive treatments of depression, including developing further ways to 
help those with depression to focus on other thoughts and actions that will compete with and quash the non-
reward attractor states that include ruminating negative thoughts (Rolls, 2016c). By combining 
understanding of the computations performed in each cortical area (Rolls, 2016a), and how alterations in the 
stability of local cortical circuits can impair the function of cortical attractor networks (Rolls, 2016a; Rolls & 
Deco, 2010), we may be at the start of a generational shift in our understanding and treatment of depression 
(Rolls, 2016c). 
Further research on the relative roles of the orbitofrontal cortex, and other areas such as the cingulate 
cortex and amygdala that are also involved in emotion, and of how treatments that influence the orbitofrontal 
cortex may be useful for depression, are key areas for future research. It will also be important to address 
further the relative contributions of the key components of the theory: that there is increased activity in a 
lateral orbitofrontal cortex non-reward attractor system in depression; that there is decreased activity of a 
medial orbitofrontal cortex reward-related system in depression; and that these two systems are reciprocally 
related.  
Given that emotions can be considered as states elicited by rewards and punishers (Rolls, 2013b, 
2014a, 2014b), a key contribution of the orbitofrontal cortex in depression is likely to be very important, 
given that rewards tend to decrease in depression and the medial orbitofrontal cortex is involved in rewards, 
and that depression involves much focus on non-rewards and punishers, in which the lateral orbitofrontal 
cortex is involved. 
 
 
16. Conclusions and future directions 
 
16.1. Representations of affective value vs intensity and identity 
An important principle that emerges from research on the brain mechanisms of emotion is that there 
is a specialized system that provides representations of the reward or reinforcing value of stimuli, and that 
this is separate from brain systems that represent the physical properties of a stimulus such as its identity 
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(e.g. that it is sweet, independently of hunger and whether we want it and it is currently rewarding; what 
object we are looking at, independently of whether we want it and it is currently rewarding, etc). The 
separation of affective processing from processing about the identity and intensity of stimuli in primates 
including humans (Rolls, 2017b) is highly adaptive, and a fundamental principle of brain design revealed by 
these investigations, for it enables us to see and learn about stimuli independently of whether we currently 
want them and find them rewarding. This enables goal-directed, emotional and motivational, behaviour to be 
separated from other types of learning that are independent of the current emotional and motivational value 
of stimuli (Rolls, 2014a). 
 
16.2. Attention to affective value vs intensity 
  These concepts have been extended to the effects of attention. For example, when subjects are 
instructed to pay attention to the pleasantness of taste stimuli (monosodium glutamate), activations were 
larger in the orbitofrontal and pregenual cingulate cortex; and when paying attention to intensity, activations 
were larger in the taste insula (see Fig. 12) (Grabenhorst & Rolls, 2008). Further, when subjects are 
instructed to pay attention to the pleasantness of olfactory stimuli, activations were larger in brain areas such 
as the orbitofrontal and pregenual cingulate cortex and hypothalamus; and when paying attention to intensity, 
activations were larger in brain areas such as the pyriform cortex and inferior frontal gyrus (Rolls, et al., 
2008a). These interesting effects are related to the fact that the processing of affective value and intensity are 
separable processes, and indicate that the exact way in which we respond to stimuli depends on whether we 
are engaged in processing their affective value or their physical properties. This has important implications 
for sensory testing, as well as for emotional responsiveness more generally. 
 
16.3. Cognitive modulation of affective value 
 It has also been possible to extend these concepts to the cognitive modulation of the affective and 
reward value of stimuli and emotion-related states. For example, it has been shown that highly cognitive, 
word-level, descriptions of olfactory (de Araujo, et al., 2005), taste (Grabenhorst, et al., 2008a), flavor 
(Grabenhorst, et al., 2008a; Plassmann, et al., 2008), and somatosensory stimuli (McCabe, et al., 2008) can 
alter activations produced by these stimuli in brain areas that represent the pleasantness of these stimuli such 
as the orbitofrontal and pregenual cingulate cortex, and in a region to which these project, the ventral 
striatum. The implication of these findings is again fascinating, for it shows that cognition can descend into 
the first stage of processing at which affective value is made explicit in the representation, to alter the 
representations that are related to affective value in these areas. 
 
16.4. Identity, affective, and decision-making tiers of processing 
 Fig. 3 is designed to draw out these issues in terms of processing hierarchies. The level of the tiered 
structure that forms a column including inferior temporal visual cortex, primary taste cortex, pyriform cortex, 
and somatosensory cortex is the level at which intensity, physical properties, and the identity of stimuli are 
represented, and in an affect-neutral way. The next tier of processing, including the orbitofrontal cortex, 
amygdala, and pregenual cingulate cortex, represents the reward/reinforcing value of stimuli and their 
corresponding subjective affective value. The next tier of processing provides a stage at which responses are 
organised to the stimuli, including autonomic responses via the lateral hypothalamus (and visceral insula not 
shown in Fig. 3); habit responses by brain regions that include the basal ganglia; and action-outcome 
learning to enable the goals represented at the second tier to be obtained. 
  
16.5. Affective value, consciousness, and the affective tier  
 The reward value of stimuli, operationally defined, is represented in the orbitofrontal cortex. But it is 
a feature of our human functional neuroimaging studies that the subjective, conscious, ratings of pleasantness 
are correlated with activations in the orbitofrontal cortex, typically linearly. Rolls has argued that there are 
dual routes to action, and that one, concerned with simple reinforcers such as taste, can in some cases be 
implemented implicitly, that is unconsciously (Rolls, 1999a; Rolls, 2004b, 2007a; Rolls, 2007b; Rolls, 
2008a; Rolls, 2014a). The conjecture is that the conscious route is needed for rational (i.e. reasoning) thought 
about plans that may have multiple steps, and that the processing in this system happens to feel like 
something. Why then might activations of simple reinforcers such as taste or warmth have their subjective 
affective value represented at all? The suggestion that is made is that reasoning may have to occur about the 
advantages of different rewards (e.g. deferring an immediate taste reward for a longer term financial reward), 
and that the simple rewards, such as taste or warmth, become conscious by virtue of entering this reasoning 
processing system (Rolls, 1999a; Rolls, 2004b, 2007a; Rolls, 2007b; Rolls, 2008a; Rolls, 2014a). (If the 
 29 
limited capacity reasoning system is not engaged in reasoning about something else, then simple rewards 
may, while it is monitoring events in the world, enter it and become conscious.) In any case, the activations 
in the orbitofrontal cortex are clearly closely related to the subjectively experienced affective value, and may 
thus provide inputs to the reasoning system. In an analogous way, the activity in the first tier of processing, 
at which intensity and identity are represented, is closely correlated with the subjective intensity of the 
stimuli, showing how the properties of what is represented in conscious experience reflects processing in 
different cortical areas. We have seen in this paper that processing in two particular brain areas, the 
orbitofrontal and pregenual cingulate cortex, is closely related to subjectively experienced affective value. 
 
16.6. Specific reward representations using a common scale 
 The representations in the orbitofrontal cortex provide evidence about the exact nature of each 
reward, as shown most clearly by the single neuron recording studies. These show that different and 
overlapping populations of neurons provide representations of combinations of the taste, texture, odor, 
temperature and visual appearance of stimuli (e.g. Fig. 3). Other orbitofrontal cortex neurons provide 
representations of which expression is present on a face, and of face identity (Rolls, et al., 2006). Thus it is 
not general reward or affect that is represented (Rolls, 2014a). The computational reason for this is that to 
guide behaviour adaptively and correctly, each reinforcer must be represented separately. When we are 
hungry, we should eat food; when thirsty, we should drink water; etc. Moreover, social behaviour to an 
individual may require representations not only of face expression, but also of face identity, and both are 
involved in typical social behaviour. 
 All these different rewards have to be in a common scale, that is, one type of reward (e.g. food 
reward) should not dominate all other types of reward, for this would be maladaptive. Making different 
rewards approximately equally rewarding makes it likely that a range of different rewards will be chosen 
over time (and depending on factors such as need state in some cases), which is adaptive and essential for 
survival (Rolls, 2014a).  
There are special mechanisms that help this common scale to operate gracefully. One is sensory-
specific satiety, the decrease in the reward value of a stimulus that typically occurs over several minutes. 
This is an elegant way of ensuring that different rewards are selected at different times, and helps to keep the 
rewards competing evenly in a common currency. 
 
16.7. Blind emotion 
In blindsight, patients with damage to the primary visual cortex may deny having any subjective 
conscious experience of seeing a stimulus, but may be able to guess better than chance what the stimulus is, 
or what the expression is on a face, and may show signs of emotional responses (de Gelder, et al., 1999; 
Tamietto, et al., 2009; Tamietto, et al., 2012; Weiskrantz, 1997, 1998). With subliminal stimuli, or in split 
brain patients, emotional responses may also be produced in the absence of consciousness awareness 
(Gazzaniga & LeDoux, 1978). I term these phenomena in which emotional stimuli may be processed but 
without consciousness awareness ‘blind emotion’. We have shown that in backward masking experiments, 
when neurons in the macaque inferior temporal visual cortex fire for approximately 30 ms and represent 
substantial information about which stimulus was shown, then humans do not report seeing them. When the 
stimulus onset asynchrony is increased to allow the inferior temporal cortex neurons to fire for 50 ms, then 
humans do report conscious awareness of the stimuli (Rolls, 2003; Rolls, Tovee, & Panzeri, 1999b; Rolls, 
Tovee, Purcell, Stewart, & Azzopardi, 1994b; Tovee & Rolls, 1995). Given these findings, I have suggested 
that the threshold for conscious awareness is greater than the threshold for the representation of substantial 
information in the visual system (Rolls, 2003). I have argued that the adaptive value of this is that the cortical 
computations related to consciousness are serial, involving higher order syntactic thought, and that the 
threshold is set slightly above that for information representation because it is inefficient to interrupt serial 
syntactic thought unless there is a reasonable probability that there is a new stimulus or event to which that 
computational processor must be switched (Rolls, 2004b, 2007a; Rolls, 2007b; Rolls, 2008a; Rolls, 2010b, 
2011a, 2014a, 2016a).  
My own theory of consciousness is that a higher order syntactic thought (HOST) system is needed to 
perform credit assignment to correct lower order syntactic multiple-step plans, and that when the HOST 
processing system is active and dealing with symbols grounded in the word, then subjective consciousness is 
a property of the operation of that system (Rolls, 2004b, 2007a; Rolls, 2007b; Rolls, 2008a; Rolls, 2010b, 
2011a, 2012c, 2014a, 2016a). (The syntax may not be as complex as that required for human language.) 
Larry Weiskrantz’ view may not be too far from part of my theory of consciousness, in that he believes that 
reflection is involved in consciousness. Indeed, whenever I met Larry for the first time each day, he would 
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ask me how I was, I would reply “Fine”, and Larry would say: “You have no right to say that, Edmund, as 
you have not reflected on it.” 
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Fig. 1. Maps of architectonic areas in the orbitofrontal cortex and medial prefrontal cortex of humans (above) 
and monkeys (below). AON – anterior olfactory nucleus; G – primary gustatory cortex; Iai, Ial, Iam, Iapm – 
subdivisions of the agranular insular cortex; OB – olfactory bulb; PC – pyriform cortex; PrCO – precentral 
opercular area. (After Öngür, Ferry and Price (2003), and Carmichael and Price (Carmichael & Price, 1994), 
reprinted from the Journal of Comparative Neurology with permission of John Wiley & Sons, Inc.) 
(OFC_Anat.eps) 
 
Fig. 2. The orbitofrontal cortex and amygdala systems involved in reward and non-reward can operate via a 
lateral hypothalamic area / lateral preoptic area (POA) to influence the Lateral Habenula, medial part, which 
in turn can influence the 5-HT (serotonin) neurons in the raphe nuclei. Many antidepressant drugs may 
influence this cortical to brainstem pathway by influencing the effects of the 5-HT neurons, which terminate 
in many brain areas. The hippocampus influence via the septal nuclei and diagonal band of Broca may 
enable reward context to access the same Lateral Habenula, medial part, to 5-HT-neuron system (Luo, 
Tahsili-Fahadan, Wise, Lupica, & Aston-Jones, 2011; Rolls, 2015b). The medial habenula also receives 
septal inputs, and projects to the interpeduncular nucleus, and thereby to 5-HT neurons (and probably 
dopamine neurons)  (Loonen & Ivanova, 2016; Proulx, Hikosaka, & Malinow, 2014). 
The orbitofrontal cortex, amygdala (and probably anterior cingulate cortex and subgenual cingulate cortex) 
systems involved in reward and non-reward can operate via a basal ganglia route (striatum, ventral pallidum, 
and globus pallidus / bed nucleus of the stria terminalis) to influence the Lateral Habenula, lateral part, which 
in turn via the GABAergic Rostromedial Tegmental nucleus can influence dopamine neurons in the 
Substantia Nigra pars compacta and ventral Tegmental Area (SNc and VTA). This provides a route for 
reward, non-reward, and reward prediction error signals of largely cortical origin to influence the dopamine 
neurons. Details of some of these anatomical connections are provided elsewhere (Loonen & Ivanova, 2016; 
Proulx, et al., 2014). 
 These connections are shown in the context of some of the pathways involved in reward-related 
processes and emotion shown on the lateral view of the brain of the macaque monkey in the upper part of the 
Figure (Rolls, 2014a). Connections from the primary taste and olfactory cortices to the orbitofrontal cortex 
and amygdala are shown. Connections are also shown in the ‘ventral visual system’ from the visual cortical 
areas V1 to V2, V4, the inferior temporal visual cortex, etc., with some connections reaching the amygdala 
and orbitofrontal cortex. In addition, connections from the somatosensory cortical areas BA 1, 2, and 3 that 
reach the orbitofrontal cortex directly and via the insular cortex, and that reach the amygdala via the insular 
cortex, are shown. as, arcuate sulcus; cal, calcarine sulcus; cs, central sulcus; lf, lateral (or Sylvian) fissure; 
lun, lunate sulcus; ps, principal sulcus; io, inferior occipital sulcus; ip, intraparietal sulcus (which has been 
opened to reveal some of the areas it contains); sts, superior temporal sulcus (which has been opened to 
reveal some of the areas it contains). AIT, anterior inferior temporal cortex; FST, visual motion processing 
area; LIP, lateral intraparietal area; MST, visual motion processing area; MT, visual motion processing area 
(also called V5); PIT, posterior inferior temporal cortex; STP, superior temporal plane; TA, architectonic 
area including auditory association cortex; TE, architectonic area including high order visual association 
cortex, and some of its subareas TEa and TEm; TG, architectonic area in the temporal pole; V1--V4, visual 
areas V1--V4; VIP, ventral intraparietal area; TEO, architectonic area including posterior visual association 
cortex. The numerals refer to architectonic areas, and have the following approximate functional 
equivalence: 1,2,3, somatosensory cortex (posterior to the central sulcus); 4, motor cortex; 5, superior 
parietal lobule; 7a, inferior parietal lobule, visual part; 7b, inferior parietal lobule, somatosensory part; 6, 
lateral premotor cortex; 8, frontal eye field; 12, part of orbitofrontal cortex; 46, dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. 
(habenula2.eps) 
 
Fig. 3. Schematic diagram showing some of the gustatory, olfactory, visual and somatosensory pathways to 
the orbitofrontal cortex, and some of the outputs of the orbitofrontal cortex, in primates. The secondary taste 
cortex, and the secondary olfactory cortex, are within the orbitofrontal cortex. V1 - primary visual cortex. V4 
- visual cortical area V4. PreGen Cing – pregenual cingulate cortex. “Gate” refers to the finding that inputs 
such as the taste, smell, and sight of food in some brain regions only produce effects when hunger is present 
(Rolls, 2014a). Tier 1: the column of brain regions including and below the inferior temporal visual cortex 
represents brain regions in which ‘what’ stimulus is present is made explicit in the neuronal representation, 
but not its reward or affective value which are represented in the next tier of brain regions (Tier 2), the 
orbitofrontal cortex and amygdala, and in the anterior cingulate cortex. In Tier 3 areas beyond these such as 
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medial prefrontal cortex area 10, choices or decisions about reward value are taken (Rolls, 2014a, 2016a; 
Rolls & Deco, 2010). Top-down control of affective response systems by cognition and by selective attention 
from the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex is also indicated. Medial PFC area 10 – medial prefrontal cortex area 
10;  VPMpc  – ventralposteromedial thalamic nucleus, the thalamic nucleus for taste. (tasolfpaths6i.eps) 
 
Fig. 4. Oral somatosensory and taste inputs to orbitofrontal cortex neurons. Above. Firing rates (mean ± sem) 
of viscosity-sensitive neuron bk244 which did not have taste responses, in that it did not respond 
differentially to the different taste stimuli. The firing rates are shown to the viscosity series, to the gritty 
stimulus (carboxymethylcellulose with Fillite microspheres), to the taste stimuli 1 M glucose (Gluc), 0.1 M 
NaCl, 0.1 M MSG , 0.01 M HCl and 0.001 M QuinineHCl, and to fruit juice (BJ). Spont = spontaneous 
firing rate. Below. Firing rates (mean ± sem) of viscosity-sensitive neuron bo34 which had no response to the 
oils (mineral oil, vegetable oil, safflower oil and coconut oil, which have viscosities which are all close to 50 
cP). The neuron did not respond to the gritty stimulus in a way that was unexpected given the viscosity of the 
stimulus, was taste tuned, and did respond to capsaicin. (After Rolls, Verhagen and Kadohisa 2003.) 
(Figure3bk244bo.eps) 
 
Fig. 5. Multimodal orbitofrontal cortex neuron with sensory-specific satiety-related responses to visual, taste 
and olfactory sensory inputs. The responses are shown before and after feeding to satiety with blackcurrant 
juice. The solid circles show the responses to blackcurrant juice. The olfactory stimuli included apple (ap), 
banana (ba), citral (ct), phenylethanol (pe), and caprylic acid (cp). The spontaneous firing rate of the neuron 
is shown (sp). (After Critchley and Rolls 1996). (trisat2_r.eps) 
 
Fig. 6. Representation of the pleasantness but not intensity of thermal stimuli in the orbitofrontal cortex (top), 
and of the intensity but not the pleasantness in the mid ventral (somatosensory) insular cortex (bottom).  a. 
SPM analysis showing a correlation in the mid orbitofrontal cortex (blue circle) at [-26 38 -10] between the 
BOLD signal and the pleasantness ratings of four thermal stimuli. Correlations are also shown in the 
pregenual cingulate cortex. For this mid orbitofrontal cortex region, (b) shows the positive correlation 
between the subjective pleasantness ratings and the BOLD signal (r=0.84, df=7, p<0.01), and (c) shows that 
there is no correlation between the subjective intensity ratings and the BOLD signal (r=0.07, df=12, p=0.8). 
 d. SPM analysis showing a correlation with intensity in the posterior ventral insula with peak at [-40 -10 -8] 
between the BOLD signal and the intensity ratings for the four thermal stimuli. For this ventral insula cortex 
region, (e) shows no correlation between the subjective pleasantness ratings and the BOLD signal (r=0.56, 
df=7, p=0.15), and (f) shows a positive correlation between the subjective intensity ratings and the BOLD 
signal (r=0.89, df=12, p<0.001). (After Rolls, Grabenhorst and Parris, 2008c) (warm_horiz.eps) 
 
Fig. 7. Visual discrimination reversal of the responses of a single neuron in the macaque orbitofrontal cortex 
when the taste with which the two visual stimuli (a triangle and a square) were associated was reversed. Each 
point is the mean poststimulus firing rate measured in a 0.5 s period over approximately 10 trials to each of 
the stimuli. Before reversal, the neuron fired most to the square when it indicated (S+) that the monkey could 
lick to obtain a taste of glucose. After reversal, the neuron responded most to the triangle when it indicated 
that the monkey could lick to obtain glucose. The response was low to the stimuli when they indicated (S-) 
that if the monkey licked then aversive saline would be obtained. B shows the behavioural response to the 
triangle and the square, and indicates that the monkey reversed rapidly. (After Rolls, et al., 1996b).  
(visrev.eps) 
 
Fig. 8. Rewards tend to be represented medially in the human orbitofrontal cortex and in the pregenual 
cingulate cortex, and non-reward and punishment laterally in the orbitofrontal cortex and in the supracallosal 
anterior cingulate cortex. Maps of subjective pleasure in the human orbitofrontal cortex (ventral view) and 
anterior cingulate and ventromedial prefrontal cortex (sagittal view). Yellow: sites where activations 
correlate with subjective pleasantness. White: sites where activations correlate with subjective 
unpleasantness. The numbers refer to effects found in specific studies. Taste: 1, 2; odor: 3-10; flavor: 11-16; 
oral texture: 17, 18; chocolate: 19; water: 20; wine: 21; oral temperature: 22, 23; somatosensory temperature: 
24, 25; the sight of touch: 26, 27; facial attractiveness: 28, 29; erotic pictures: 30; laser-induced pain: 31.  
Consistent laterality effects are not generally observed in these investigations. (Reprinted from Trends in 
Cognitive Sciences, 15 (2), Fabian Grabenhorst and Edmund T. Rolls, Value, pleasure and choice in the 




Fig. 9. Evidence that there are non-reward error-related neurons that maintain their firing after non-reward is 
obtained. Error neuron: Responses of an orbitofrontal cortex neuron that responded only when the macaque 
licked to a visual stimulus during reversal, expecting to obtain fruit juice reward, but actually obtained the 
taste of aversive saline because it was the first trial of reversal (trials 3, 6, and 13). Each vertical line 
represents an action potential; each L indicates a lick response in the Go-NoGo visual discrimination task. 
The visual stimulus was shown at time 0 for 1 s. The neuron did not respond on most reward (R) or saline (S) 
trials, but did respond on the trials marked S x, which were the first or second trials after a reversal of the 
visual discrimination on which the monkey licked to obtain reward, but actually obtained saline because the 
task had been reversed. The two times at which the reward contingencies were reversed are indicated. After 
responding to non-reward, when the expected reward was not obtained, the neuron fired for many seconds, 
and was sometimes still firing at the start of the next trial. It is notable that after an expected reward was not 
obtained due to a reversal contingency being applied, on the very next trial the macaque selected the 
previously non-rewarded stimulus. This shows that rapid reversal can be performed by a non-associative 
process, and must be rule-based. (After Thorpe, Rolls and Maddison 1983.) (RasterOF204Lab.eps) 
 
Fig. 10a. Evidence that the human lateral orbitofrontal cortex is activated by non-reward. Activation of the 
lateral orbitofrontal cortex in a visual discrimination reversal task on reversal trials, when a face was selected 
but the expected reward was not obtained, indicating that the subject should select the other face in future to 
obtain the reward. a) A ventral view of the human brain with indication of the location of the two coronal 
slices (b,c) and the transverse slice (d). The activations with the red circle in the lateral orbitofrontal cortex 
(OFC, peaks at [42 42 -8] and [-46 30 -8]) show the activation on reversal trials compared to the non-reversal 
trials. For comparison, the activations with the blue circle show the fusiform face area produced just by face 
expressions, not by reversal, which are also indicated in the coronal slice in (c).  b) A coronal slice showing 
the activation in the right orbitofrontal cortex on reversal trials. Activation is also shown in the supracallosal 
anterior cingulate region (Cingulate, green circle) that is also known to be activated by many punishing, 
unpleasant, stimuli (see Grabenhorst and Rolls (2011)). (From NeuroImage 20 (2), Morten L. Kringelbach 
and Edmund T. Rolls, Neural correlates of rapid reversal learning in a simple model of human social 
interaction, pp. 1371--83, Copyright, 2003, with permission from Elsevier.)  
Fig. 10b. Activations in the human lateral orbitofrontal cortex are related to a signal to change behavior in 
the stop-signal task. In the task, a left or right arrow on a screen indicates which button to touch. However on 
some trials, an up-arrow then appears, and the participant must change the behavior, and stop the response. 
There is a larger response on trials on which the participant successfully changes the behavior and stops the 
response, as shown by the contrast stop-success – stop-failure, in the ventrolateral prefrontal cortex in a 
region including the lateral orbitofrontal cortex, with peak at [-42 50 -2] indicated by the cross-hairs, 
measured in 1709 participants. There were corresponding effects in the right lateral orbitofrontal cortex [42 
52 -4]. Some activation in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex in an area implicated in attention is also shown. 
(After Deng, Rolls et al, 2017). 
Fig. 10c. Bold signal in the macaque lateral orbitofrontal related to win-stay / lose-shift performance, that is, 
to reward reversal performance. (After Chau et al, 2015). (OFCfacereversalSSTmac.eps) 
 
Fig. 11. Cognitive modulation of affective representations in the medial orbitofrontal cortex. a. The medial 
orbitofrontal cortex was more strongly activated when the flavor stimulus was labelled ‘rich and delicious 
flavor’ (MSGVrich) than when it was labelled ‘boiled vegetable water’ (MSGVbasic) ([-8 28 -20]). b. The 
timecourse of the BOLD signals for the two conditions. The means across subjects ±sem are shown. c. The 
BOLD signal in the medial orbitofrontal cortex was correlated with the subjective pleasantness ratings of 
taste and flavor (mean across subjects ±sem, r=0.86, p<0.001).  (After Grabenhorst, Rolls and Bilderbeck 
2008a) (cog_umami.eps) 
 
Fig. 12. Effects of attention to the pleasantness vs the intensity of a taste stimulus (0.1 M monosodium 
glutamate, which was identical on all trials). Top: The contrast paying attention to pleasantness – paying 
attention to intensity. a: A significant difference was found in the medial orbitofrontal cortex at [-6 14 -20] 
(at the cursor) which extended forward into the pregenual cingulate cortex (at [-4 46 -8]). b: The activations 
(% BOLD change) were correlated with the subjective pleasantness ratings in the medial orbitofrontal cortex. 
(r=0.94, df=8, p<<0.001). c.: The parameter estimates (mean ± sem across subjects) for the medial 
orbitofrontal cortex activations for the conditions of paying attention to pleasantness or to intensity. The 
parameter estimates were significantly different (p< 10-4). 
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Bottom : The contrast paying attention to intensity – paying attention to pleasantness. d: A significant 
difference was found in the taste insula at [42 18 -14] (indicated by the cursor). e: The activations (% BOLD 
change) were correlated with the subjective intensity ratings in the taste insula medial orbitofrontal cortex. 
(r=0.89, df=15, p<<0.001). f.: The parameter estimates (mean ± sem across subjects) for the taste insula for 
the conditions of paying attention to intensity or to pleasantness. The parameter estimates were significantly 
different (p< 0.001). (After Grabenhorst and Rolls, 2008) (tasteattn_sagittal.eps) 
 
Fig. 13. Pregenual cingulate cortex vs medial area 10 in decision-making. (a) A contrast of all trials on which 
decisions were made vs all trials on which ratings were made between thermal stimuli showed a significant 
effect in the medial prefrontal cortex area 10, as indicated in red ([6 54 -8]). This contrast showed no 
significant difference in the pregenual cingulate cortex, although here, as shown in blue, there was a strong 
and significant correlation with the pleasantness ratings ([4 38 -2]). (b) Shows that the % BOLD signal in the 
pregenual cingulate cortex was correlated with the pleasantness ratings on the trials on which ratings were 
made (r=0.84, df=7, p=0.005). (c) Compares the activations (mean ± sem) in medial area 10 with those in the 
pregenual cingulate cortex (PGC) for decision and rating trials. There was a significant interaction (p=0.015). 
(After Grabenhorst, Rolls and Parris, 2008b) (warm_decide.eps) 
 
Fig. 14. Interaction of orbitofrontal cortex non-reward networks with language networks in depression. 
Illustration of how an overactive non-reward attractor network in the lateral orbitofrontal cortex could send 
information forward to networks for language and planning ahead which could in turn send top-down 
feedback back to the orbitofrontal non-reward network to maintain its over-activity. It is suggested that such 
a system contributes to the persistent ruminating thoughts in depression. (DepArchi.eps) 
 
Fig. 15. Resting state functional connectivity in depression. A. Cluster functional connectivity matrix. The 
color bar shows the -log10 of the p value for the difference of the functional connectivity. Blue indicates 
reduced functional connectivity, and yellow/orange/red increased functional connectivity. The matrix 
contains rows and columns for all cases in which there were 10 or more significant voxels within a cluster. 
ACC - anterior cingulate cortex; MedTL - medial temporal lobe, including parts of the parahippocampal 
gyrus; Thal - thalamus. The abbreviations are from the AAL2 (Rolls, et al., 2015) (see also (Cheng, et al., 
2016)). B. The medial and lateral orbitofrontal cortex networks that show different functional connectivity in 
patients with depression. A decrease in functional connectivity is shown in blue, and an increase in red. 
MedTL -- medial temporal lobe from the parahippocampal gyrus to the temporal pole; MidTG21R - middle 
temporal gyrus area 21 right; OFC13 - medial orbitofrontal cortex area 13; OFC47/12R - lateral orbitofrontal 
cortex area 47/12 right. The lateral orbitofrontal cortex cluster in OFC47/12 is visible on the ventral view of 
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